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The study addressed the lack of identity management practices in Texas community 
colleges to identify guest users who access college computers. Guest user access is required 
by Texas law and is part of the state’s mission to bridge the technology gap; however, 
improper identification methods leave the college vulnerable to liability issues. The 
purpose of this study was to eliminate or mitigate liabilities facing colleges by creating and 
using security policies to identify guest users. This study combined the theoretical concepts 
of Cameron’s internal security management model with the external trust models of the 
Liberty Alliance and Microsoft’s Passport software. The research question revolved around 
the identity and access management framework used by 13 community colleges in Texas to 
track guest users and the college’s ability to protect the college from illegal acts. Using a 
grounded theory approach, data were collected by interviewing 13 information technology 
management professionals at the community colleges regarding their security policies and 
procedures as well as by campus observations of security practices. The results of constant 
comparison analysis indicate that no universal theory was being used.  Only 3 of the 13 
colleges tracked guest user access. Reasons for not tracking guest access included lack of 
financial and technology resources and process knowledge. Based on these findings, the 
identity management infrastructure theory was recommended for network access control, 
self-registration, and identity authentication at these colleges and many other colleges. The 
implications for social change include raising awareness of the risks most community 
colleges face from network security breaches, regulatory noncompliance, and lawsuit 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Background of the Study 
According to Razavi and Iverson (2008), user access to information systems (IS) 
is managed by direct interaction between the information technology (IT) department and 
the users. At most community colleges or universities, access is granted traditionally by 
management to faculty, students, and staff as users of the IT system. All these users go 
through an application or verification process before access to college resources is 
granted. Razavi and Iverson stated that this access has grown to include vendors, 
suppliers, alumni, and guests. The growth in traditional and nontraditional users of 
community college and university resources has pushed the limit of IT resources in 
providing services to many academic communities in a secure environment.  
As community colleges and universities move away from traditional paper-based 
business models and move to paperless models, the resources needed to grant and track 
access have been increasing. This automation of community college and university 
business processes has increased efficiencies in many areas, but it has made data and 
resource protection more challenging to IT departments. Tipton and Krause (2012) 
identified electronic fraud and identity theft as the top risks to community colleges and 
universities. Identity management (IdM), or the ability to identify users as well as those 
resources a user can access, has become one of the most important strategic 
responsibilities of community colleges and universities. 
The inability to track guest user activities can leave colleges vulnerable to data 
breaches, software piracy, financial liability, and institutional embarrassment. This does 
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not appear to be a new problem in network security. A 2008 Association for Information 
Communications Technology Professionals in Higher Education (ACUTA) survey 
revealed a relatively high level of breaches in security systems maintained by college IT 
professionals. Forty-seven percent of ACUTA survey respondents reported at least one 
highly significant security breach and 71% reported minor security breaches to their 
institution security system (Landsman, 2009). None of these security breaches could be 
traced to the end user. The results of the ACUTA survey mirror the results of an Emory 
University survey from 2003. The Emory survey showed that nearly 80% of the 
respondents agreed that network security policies were important; however, only half of 
the respondents were taking active measures to combat the increases in security breaches 
(Cox & Kistner, 2003). 
These surveys showed that little has changed regarding security breaches in the 
six years between the Emory and ACUTA surveys. Analysis of the surveys showed that 
most college IT professionals believe their campus networks are secure; however, they 
also admit to large numbers of security breaches. College IT professionals ranked high on 
the survey the need to protect college networks by tracking individuals who access 
college computer resources.  
The IT professionals ranked high the inability to track security breaches on their 
networks. Consequently, there is a need for further research in the area of granting, 
identifying, and tracking guest users at community colleges to protect the colleges from 
potential damages associated with guests using college resources inappropriately. Identity 
management (IdM) covers nearly all aspects of computer access from virtual and physical 
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access, to regulating data storage, and to providing protection for individuals under the 
control of the organization (Jøsang & Pope, 2005). The literature is missing a secure and 
cost effective methodology to identify users who do not come under the direct control of 
an organization. More and more emphasis will be placed on college IT professionals to 
allow access to college resources as colleges move away from paper-based systems to 
paperless systems. All of this access indicates the need for knowing who is using the 
college system as a preventative measure to protect against inappropriate use of college 
assets. 
Problem Statement 
The Texas legislature required all community colleges in Texas to grant open 
access to computer resources to all residents as guest users.  This requirement is part of 
the effort to bridge the digital divide or to bridge the gap initiative (The League for 
Innovation in the Community College, n.d.). The problem that was explored in this study 
is the inappropriate use of the computer system and the potential for security breaches at 
community colleges in Texas that can occur because of the lack of tracking guest users. 
Initial observation of the methods colleges use to track guest usage are wide-ranging. 
Standardized methods are needed to eliminate inconsistencies and provide adequate guest 
tracking methods. Guidance is needed to eliminate inconsistencies in identifying guest 
users and provide methods that will adequately track the activities of guest users, 
especially those who intend to use the college system inappropriately.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative case study is to expand the research on network 
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security at community colleges in Texas. Much has been written about intrusion detection 
systems to keep external hackers and intruders out of a college network by using IdM 
systems to manage access to college resources (Oblinger, 2003). Currently there are no 
effective guidelines for IT professionals at community colleges in Texas for allowing 
external guests to have internal access to computer resources in a secure environment. 
This leaves institutions to develop their own methods for allowing access to computer 
resources to guests (Oblinger, 2006). Without guidance, colleges could be inviting 
security breaches into their information technology system without retribution. 
Identity management in higher education is not a new phenomenon (Salomon, 
Cassat, & Thibeau, 2003). Francia and Hutchinson (2014) extended the research into the 
liability issues associated with guest users. Francia and Hutchinson differentiated the 
types of users an organization allows access to computer resources. Guests are not under 
the same controls or scrutiny as college employees and students. Allowing access to 
computer resources without knowing who is using the resources places a significant 
potential security liability on community colleges. To allow ease of access to computer 
resources, many community colleges have adopted generic logins that identify a 
computer being used, not the user of the computer. Without the ability to track guest 
access, the college is now open to liability for inappropriate or illegal actions taken by 
unidentifiable guests. This inability to track guest users leaves the college open to 
liabilities that may take resources away from the college’s primary mission.  
Current IdM focuses on allowing access to computer resources to individuals who 
have gone through a vetting process by the institution. Employees complete an interview 
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and hiring process through the human resources department (Donnet, Gueye, & Kaafar, 
2010). Students are admitted to the college through admissions and registration 
departments. Vendors are vetted through the procurement department. Access to 
computer resources is allowed only after the individual has been vetted and the IT 
department issues user credentials (Donnet, Gueye, & Kaafar, 2010).  
Texas community colleges have the additional requirements of allowing access to 
computer resources to community members or guests who have not gone through any 
vetting process. According to Nelson, general counsel for the Lonestar Community 
College district, community colleges in Texas have a mandate to provide open access to 
computer and Internet resources to the community at large (personal communication, 
January 22, 2009). This regulation comes from the Texas Department of Information 
Resources rule 1 TAC 201.13, Information Security Standards. These rules revolve 
around the funding formula the Texas legislature uses to fund community colleges in 
Texas. Community colleges in Texas receive approximately 57% of their funding from 
the State and local property taxes (Dowd & Shieh, 2013). This community funding brings 
access to the college’s resources.  
According to Levine and Kater (2012), access to community college resources 
must be granted; however, that access is not unlimited. Community members or guests do 
not have access to resources when the college is closed nor can they take the resources 
off campus. Other security precautions associated with granting access to campus 
resources should also be followed. Physical security measures such as rooms with locked 
doors and computers secured with cables are in effect. Virtual security leaves much to be 
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desired. Employees and students under the direct control of the college are issued user 
IDs and passwords to access computers and network resources. Identities of both 
employees and students are verified and signed security policies can be strictly enforced. 
These policies should also be extended to guests (Levine & Kater, 2012).  
Open access to computer resources is part of the mission of Texas community 
colleges. With the open access requirement to computer resources, community colleges 
need to be aware of the special security needs to protect the colleges from security 
breaches by hackers using college computers (Cain, 2003). Anonymity or the lack of 
tracking is one of the most coveted prizes of the hacker (Backes, Clark, Kate, 
Simeonovski, & Druschel, 2014). Community colleges are at risk for data breaches and 
criminal activities when the college does not collect identification from guests and 
associate that identification with a computer (Cronin, 2010). The purpose of this study is 
to determine how IdM can be used to protect colleges from security breaches caused by 
unidentified guest users. 
Research Questions 
The central research question of this study is: How do community colleges in the 
State of Texas implement an IdM system that is capable of identifying guest users and 
protecting the college from security breaches such as inappropriate information access, 
hacking into other networks, launching computer viruses or Internet worms, or other 
white-collar crimes committed by guests using the college’s computer network?  From 
this central question, the sub questions to be answered to address the problem are:  
RQ1. How do community colleges in the State of Texas implement an Identity 
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Management (IdM) system that is capable of properly identifying guest users and 
protecting the college from illegal acts such as inappropriate information access, 
hacking into other networks, launching computer viruses or Internet worms, or 
other white-collar crimes committed by guests using the college’s computer 
network?  From this central question, the sub questions to be answered to address 
the problem are:  
RQ2. What are the IdM methods used by IT managers at Texas community colleges to 
identify guests? 
RQ3. How affective are the IdM strategies used by IT managers at Texas community 
colleges in track guest users to improve the security of computer networks? 
RQ4. What do IT managers see as the difference between their current IdM practices and 
their ideal IdM system? 
Theoretical Foundation 
This study is based on past identity management research. I combined Cameron’s 
internal security management model of trust, vulnerability, threat, and identity (Cameron, 
2005) with both the external trust models of the Liberty Alliance (McEvily & Tortoriello, 
2011) and Microsoft’s .NET Passport (Alotaibi, Wald, & Gilbert, 2012). All three 
provide empirical evidence of the importance of a security model, both internal and 
external to the organization. The design and analysis of a security system are based on 
security models. These models combine the security policies and procedures needed to 
enforce identifying those who use the system. These models can be seen as symbolic 
representations of policies that guide policy makers’ requirements into rules that can be 
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followed and enforced. 
Much has been written regarding how organizations should identify users of 
network resources; however, these guidelines focus on employees, students, and vendors. 
Nothing is written regarding granting and tracking access to external guest users. Identity 
management can be assisted by the use of information security governance. Information 
security governance is a relatively new theoretical construct. Von Solms (2010) described 
information security governance in terms of waves. Wave 1 is the technological or IT 
component of information security. Wave 2 is concerned with information security 
management associated with security. Wave 3 looks at the institutionalization of 
information security in organizations. Information security governance provides a superb 
framework in which to introduce IdM. Wave 4 of the framework can guide IdM with 
regulatory compliance requirements related to the college’s own legal and regulatory 
environments. Identity management can be placed within a governance framework to 
determine the actual security effectiveness. The management of IdM can now become the 
focus.  
Community colleges in southeast Texas may have already developed IdM policies 
and procedures that allow guest users to access computer resources (Stasiak & Zielinųki, 
2013). These policies and procedures can be compared with information security 
governance to determine the effectiveness of the college’s IdM practices. Current models 
such as the Bell-LaPadula and Biba models work well for identifying individuals who are 
vetted by an organization. Both models are wholly lacking for guest access (Stasiak & 
Zielinųki, 2013). The strategy that will interest community college IT managers is a 
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specific implementation strategy of IdM (Stasiak & Zielinųki, 2013).  
Stasiak and Zielinųki (2013) identified five drivers that influential the success of 
any identity management system. First is regulatory compliance or following the law. 
International, federal, state, and many local governments have enacted laws dealing with 
financial services, healthcare, and homeland security that require minimum standards for 
secure access control to computer and network infrastructure. Second is operational 
effectiveness, the time it takes to allow access to resources. Speed and accuracy are the 
keys to this driver. Improving this balance may require automation. The third driver is 
business facilitation. This facilitation is the ease of handling the business models used by 
different areas of the organization. Different areas of an organization may fall under 
different legal jurisdictions and/or require different levels of authentication and access to 
resources. An organization must be able to provide processes for these situations. Fourth 
is cost reduction or simply cost issues. There has been a growth in the number of 
community colleges in Texas and these colleges have seen an increased enrollment. More 
and more demands for access to computer resources are placed on organizations every 
day. Current levels of staffing have difficulty in accommodating the needs of this 
increasing demand. Organizations must look to cost savings options such as automation 
and partnerships in order to meet future demand. Fifth, and lastly, is the security risk 
management of the organization (Stasiak, & Zielinųki, 2013). Many of the laws enacted 
have compliance requirements to ensure the laws are being followed. This type of audit 
capability assures compliance with the law and protection for users who access the 
organization’s resources (Stasiak, & Zielinųki, 2013).  
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Stasiak and Zielinski’s (2013) five drivers are used by the REAL ID Act, .NET 
Passport, and the Liberty Alliance as part of their best practices guidelines (Alotaibi, et 
al., 2012). The REAL ID act is a legislative initiative to standardize identification 
requirements for governmental issued ID cards and driver licenses (Harper, 2012). Texas 
is one of the states using the REAL ID Act standards for ID cards and driver licenses 
(Kephart, 2011). The .NET Passport and Liberty Alliance are examples of industry 
initiatives to allow users to port identification credentials across organizational 
boundaries in the private sector.  
Both Microsoft’s .NET frame work and the Liberty Alliance Project have 
developed various models for IdM within a domain (Kephart, 2011). Although their 
methods differ, the main goal of both is to provide public and private sector organizations 
with a standardized method of obtaining and using digital identification issued by a 
variety of trusted third party identity providers or a centrally verified database. Both 
stress mutual acceptance of rules, policies, and business processes between organizations, 
users, and third party identity providers. All these are essential to a cost effective, safe, 
and secure access to computer systems that connect to network resources and the Internet. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the IdM theory behind both the Microsoft’s .NET 
framework and the Liberty Alliance Project. First, organizations need to develop 
appropriate policies for users to access computer resources. Second, these policies are 
enforced every time a user logs on to a computer. The third and fourth steps require 
checking the user’s login credentials or issues credentials based upon the organization’s 
policies. User credential can be checked via either internal or external sources. Access to 
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computer resources and the Internet will be granted once the identity of a user can be 
confirmed. 
  
Figure 1. IdM authentication (Permission to reproduce image) 
The preliminary results of this research indicated that many community colleges 
in Texas allow open access to anyone who wishes to use college computer resources. A 
few community colleges asked users to sign a paper log and even fewer asked guest to 
provide identification before issuing a user ID and password. Most colleges used generic 
logins that only identifies the computer, not the user. Neither the Texas legislature nor the 
Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board has issued guidelines to assist colleges in 
developing their policies and procedures. This leaves colleges to create their own policies 
based upon IdM solutions provided by the college’s software vendors or to look for 
outside solution such as the Microsoft’s .NET framework and the Liberty Alliance 
Project are the (Alzomai, 2011). 
12 
 
Nature of the Study 
The case study type used in this study is the explanatory study. The explanatory 
case study should be used when a researcher attempts to identify patterns and relate the 
variations of those patterns to each other (Yin, 2009). This type of case study answers the 
how and why questions that would explain an event. I used this type of case study 
because the focus of this inquirer was on how the IdM policies were created and why 
they were being (or not being) implemented by community colleges in Texas. Patterns 
were identified once the case study was completed. 
The key concepts of IdM topology and deployment are shown in Figure 2. In this 
figure an identity uniquely identifies a person, place, or thing. Identity is verified by 
something that is known, such as a password or PIN; a token, such as an ATM card; a 
physical attribute, such as a finger print or retinal pattern; or a combination of these items 
(Vij, Majumdar, Dhar, & Vanecek 2014). 
 




The following terms will be used in this study. These definitions are to assist 
noninformation technology professionals to better understand this study.  
Access management: The ability to control an entity’s (usually a person) access to 
network resources (Vij, et al., 2014). 
Account: The collection and storage of data about an entity. An account is the 
basis for access to network resources (Forbes & Davis, 2008). 
Authentication: The ability to prove one’s identity. This works much like 
providing a driver’s license when cashing a check (Ning, Liu, & Wenliang, 2008). 
Authorization: The list of resources a network user has access to once authenticate 
to the network (Leggett, 2006). 
Certification authority: A trusted third party whom an organization accepts 
identity credentials from. The department of motor vehicles is an example of a trusted 
third party for identification cards and drivers’ licenses (Polk & Hastings, 2006). 
Credentials: An identifier of a user and proof of the user’s identity between 
network resources and networks (Tsang, Au, Kapadia, & Smith, 2007). 
Digital identity: A digital token attached to documents, usually e-mails, by a 
trusted third party as authentication of a user’s identity (Ning et al., 2008). 
Directory schema: All the possible ways in which an entity can be known on a 
network and how that data can be held in directory structure (Tsang et al., 2007). 
Directory services: The database where all network resources are identified and 
make the resources available to authorized users (Wachsmann, 2005). 
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EDUCAUSE: A nonprofit organization that provides IT resources and information 
to colleges and universities (EDUCAUSE, 2008). 
Enrollment: Once an entity has an account the entity is registered with 
permissions to use specific network resources (Ning, et al., 2008). 
Federation: An organization of a group of organization who agree upon the use of 
specific policies, procedures, software, and hardware in granting access to network 
resources. Once an entity is authenticated in one organization, it is authenticated in all 
organizations in the federation (Bhargav-Spantzel, Squicciarini, & Bertino 2005). 
Integrity: A security concept that prevents addition, modification, and deletion of 
data from unauthorized users (Leggett, 2006). 
Microsoft active directory: A vendor specific directory service that provides 
standardized software and methods for data storage and retrieval (Microsoft, 2008). 
Novell eDirectory: Another vendor specific directory service. This object oriented 
structure organizations all network objects in a tree structure. The objects or assets can be 
organized as people, department, roles, groups, and equipment (Novell, 2008). 
Person registry: A meta directory that allows users to login to all network 
resources. This directory contains not only the personal identifier, but also history of all 
user attributes (Tipton & Krause, 2012). 
Provisioning: The process used to acquiring, maintaining, and deleting digital 
identities across a network. Provisioning identifies resources on a network and will track 
user ID and password requirements such as length, characters, and expiration dates. 
There are two types of provisioning, identity and user. Identity provision deals with 
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entities accessing resources and user provisioning deals with services and privileges to 
data and resources (Vij, Majumdar, Dhar, & Vanecek, 2014). 
Role-based access control (RBAC): Security privileges assigned to each user 
based upon their role in an organization (Lyons-Burke, 2007). 
System-development process (SDP): The method used to create and implementing 
an information system (IT). When used correctly it will create repeatable methods to 
develop an IT and provide methods to measure improvement between systems (Bentley 
et al., 2004).  
Web-based access management (WAM): A single sign on for web based 
resources. Used largely with intranet portals to provide authentication and authorization 
via a web front end interface (Nikols & Gebel, 2006). 
Worm: A self-replicating computer program sent across the Internet to infect 
computers. Worms are designed to exploit security holes in computers connected to the 
Internet. The worm will install itself on the computer, copy itself, and send the copy to 
the next computer on the Internet (Sudduth, 2001). 
Assumptions 
Community colleges in Texas are required to have their facilities open to the 
general public; however, that does not mean that the doors should be unlocked at all 
times. The grounds and facilities of the college must meet minimum security standards to 
protect and safeguard the college’s property and resources. This same level of security 
should be present also for computer and network usage. Without specific directions on 
how to manage guest access to network resources, colleges will need to find their own 
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IdM solutions. The assumption that serve as the foundation for this research is that 
community colleges in Texas have some policies and procedures in place to identify 
guest users, these policies and procedures are sufficient to track guest user access, and 
these policies and procedures are put into practice by those who work in the computer 
labs.  
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of the study was focused on the policies, procedures, and practices of 
IT professionals at community colleges in Texas in order to identify guest users on the 
college’s computer system.  Examining the IdM methodology used by college IT 
professionals to identify guest users can be used to determine how secure the college’s 
network is from unauthorized usage and how well the college is protected from liability 
issues arising from such unauthorized usage. 
Limitations 
Computer and network security is a broad and expanding topic. This study was 
limited to the security issues facing community colleges in the State of Texas because of 
their open access requirement. Much will be written regarding court cases, laws, and 
standards regarding security. Several sections will expand into general areas of computer 
security such as firewalls, proxy servers, traffic monitoring, encryption, privacy, 
copyright protection, and data theft. These sections are intended to make the reader more 
familiar with the complex and growing area of computer security and the issues facing 
computer professionals. Although these sections will appear in this study, they will be 
limited to only basic information or directly linked to IdM issues facing community 
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colleges in Texas. 
Significance of the Study 
Significance to Practice 
The problem is significant to IT professionals and college administrators who 
want to balance the open nature of a community college with the rigors of also providing 
a secure network environment that will protect the college from liability for unauthorized 
usage. 
This study was intended to provide IT professionals at community colleges across 
the state of Texas a benchmark for allowing guests access to computer resources and 
methods to implement IdM practices on to a population that has not previously been 
placed under traditional IdM practices at community colleges. 
Significance to Theory 
This study fills a gap in the IdM literature regarding non-traditional users of 
community college computer resources, or guest users. Because of the open nature of 
community colleges in Texas, proper IdM is vital to protect the college from liability 
brought on by guest users who use the college’s computer systems for unauthorized 
usage such as launching DoS attacks, black hat hacking, or launching viruses.  Proper 
IdM implementation will also reduce anonymous computer usage. The ability to identify 
computer users preforming unauthorized or criminal acts on the college’s computers will 
mitigate the college’s liability for such attacks.  
Awareness of proper IdM can lead to support from senior management for proper 
budgeting and resource allocation to help protect the college’s computer infrastructure.  
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The theoretical construct was completed by interviewing IT professionals at 13 
community colleges in Texas and verified by visits to open computer labs at each college.  
The results of this study will provide IT professionals at community colleges with the 
necessary tools for developing policies and procedures to identify guest users and train 
computer lab employees how to implement practices to protect the college from liability. 
Significance to Social Change 
Allowing access to computer resources at community colleges helps to narrow the 
digital divide. The term digital divide is used to describe the gap between those with 
access to and those without access to technology or the Internet. Johnson, et al. (2013) 
used the research by Millron and Miles to define the problem. The authors stated that 
members of society who do not have access to technology are at a greater disadvantage of 
becoming disenfranchised spectators in the new digital economy. Without access to the 
technology, these members of society have difficulty in developing the skills needed to 
function in the digital age.  
This problem has been taken up by many organizations. One of the notable 
organizations is the League for Innovation in the Community College (the League). The 
League has undertaken a substantial project to bridge the digital divide by using 
community colleges across the nation to provide access to technology and technology 
skills to the digitally disadvantaged (The League for Innovation in the Community 
College, n.d.). The League has setup resources to encourage community colleges to take 
aggressive actions within the community to find ways to reach the diverse populations 
associated with a community college. The Bridging the Digital Divide Project provides 
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resourses for community college educators to collaborate with community leaders and 
corporations to work together to bridge the digital divide.  
Many of the community colleges in Texas have taken up the League’s challenge 
of bridging the digital divide. In 2006, Lonestar Community College System instituted a 
plan to address the issue, called the Workforce Development Environmental Scanning 
and Strategic Planning. Section, or trend statement, five recognizes the growing 
dichotomy between the lack of access to technology in many minority and low-income 
populations and the necessity for technology skills in the workforce. This trend statement 
lists 14 specific areas of concentration that the college will provide in all workforce 
programs across the district to narrow the gap in the digital divide (Lonestar College, 
2007, p. 5). In 2003, Wimbish, president of Cedar Valley College (one of community 
colleges in the Dallas County Community College District), began working with local 
government to procure a $500,000 grant for the college to incorporate methods to narrow 
the digital divide for the citizens of Lancaster Texas (Dallas Community College District, 
2003). Alamo Community College in San Antonio completed a district-wide survey on 
bridging the digital divide. This 59 page document assessed the success of Alamo 
Community College’s initiative in providing student access to technology and the 
Internet at school and in their home. This document also provided recommendations for 
improving Alamo’s outreach for narrowing the digital divide for citizens of San Antonio 
(Alamo Community College, 2008). 
These are a few of the initiatives under way at Texas community colleges to 
narrow the gap in the digital divide. One of the common themes running through all these 
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projects is the need to allow access to expensive college resources. This access does not 
come without costs and risks. Community colleges are spending hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in taxpayers’ money to allow access to and training on modern technology. 
This investment must be protected both physically and virtually (Song & Ma, 2012). 
Students, employees, and guests are allowed access to the college’s computer and 
network resources; however, these resources are located in rooms with doors that lock. 
Most of these computers are locked down to a table via cables. Virtual access must be 
protected. Computer users cannot have access to any resources or data held by the college 
without proper credentials, such as self identification and verification of identification. 
One of the key components to narrowing the digital divide is a proper identity 
management system (Wiburg, Tellez, Altamirano, & Parra, 2015). 
Summary and Transition 
The growth in traditional and nontraditional users of community college and 
university resources has pushed the limit of IT resources in providing services to many 
academic communities in a secure environment. The problem that was explored in this 
study is the inappropriate use of the computer system and the potential for security 
breaches at community colleges in Texas that can occur because of the lack of tracking 
guest users. The purpose of this study was to eliminate or mitigate liabilities facing 
colleges by creating and using security policies to identify guest users. This study 
combines the theoretical concepts of Cameron’s internal security management model 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I will present a review of relevant literature on the topic of 
network security with a focus on the policies and procedures at community colleges with 
an emphasis on IdM models. Wolcott (2007) stated the purpose of the literature review 
chapter is to link the literature to research and methods that complement and enhance the 
findings of new research. Leedy and Ormrod (2004) further advised researchers of the 
importance in aligning current research with previous works related to the study. This 
gives the researcher a historical perspective of the research topic. Since the historical 
perspective is important to this study, the primary timeframe for this literature review will 
be mainly from 2000 to 2009. Literature from an earlier time will be introduced in this 
research only as a historical reference to show that security problems have been with the 
industry for some time. Current literature during the last five years will be highlighted 
primarily as extensions of the trends from previous literature. 
The works that I reviewed were mainly related to IdM, but were not limited to this 
topic. Topics contained in this chapter include research on IdM solutions, the capabilities 
of IdM architectures, the challenges associated with IdM implementation, IdM features 
and paradigms, the role of IdM solutions, the growing legal importance of IdM solutions 
in organizations, mobile IdM systems, information security governance, and the use of 
client-based and server-based IdM applications. Databases searched for this study 
include, but are not limited to ACM digital library, Computers and Applied Sciences 
Complete database, IEEE Xplore digital library, Google scholar, Gartner group, and 
Educause.  Each database was searched using terms such as identity management, 
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community colleges, network security, community college budgets, and bridging the 
digital divide.  Articles selected for use in this study contained information about how 
community colleges use security systems to monitor computer usage, identity 
management procedures, internal and external identity best-of-practices, and community 
college methods for narrowing the digital divide.  This chapter concludes with a 
discussion of how important IdM solutions have become to colleges and universities. 
 Conceptual Framework 
The Basic Elements of an IdM System 
The first step in IdM is to establish your identity.  In an IdM system, an individual 
is issued a digital identity once an individual’s identity is verified to a central authority. 
Donnet, Gueye, and Kaafar (2010) listed digital identifiers as unique tokens that are 
assigned to individuals once an account is setup. These tokens are traditionally issued in 
the form of a password, ID card, and/or biometrics (finger print, retinal scan, voice 
recognition, etc.). Any of the above or a combination of the above can then be used with 
a user ID to allow access to network resources. 
The second step in IdM is proving your identity or authentication. The process of 
authentication begins when an individual logs into a networked computer (Vij, 
Majumdar, Dhar, & Vanecek, 2014). Authentication is based on matching multiple 
identifiers provided by a user. The process most networked computer users will recognize 
is the two-factor authentication, a user ID and password. Authentication is only granted 
when both are presented correctly to a network directory service. Another example is an 
ATM card and PIN number. Cash will not be dispensed from the ATM unless both are 
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present (Jaferian, Hawkey, Sotirakopoulos, Velez-Rojas, & Beznosov, 2014). 
The third step is Authorization.  In this step a user is given access to network 
resources.  Once a user is authenticated to the network, the user now has access to 
network resources based upon his or her group, role, or function membership (Whitman 
& Mattord, 2013). For example, a faculty member once authenticated should have access 
to the department’s printers, network drives, course information, and information about 
students in his or her class. However, this access is not unlimited. The faculty member‘s 
access to student information should include only information relevant to the course. The 
access also is limited to view only. The faculty member should not be able to change or 
modify student data. Authorization is initially set up via IT’s access control rules. These 
access control rules will determine if an authenticated user has access to specific network 
resources (Kulkarni & Tripathi, 2011). 
The fourth step is to identify what the user can do with the resources he as access 
to.  This step is known as Entitlement. When a network user logs into a networked 
computer and is authenticated, the entitlement IdM service examines the first piece of 
user data (usually the login name) to determine the permissions sets available to the user 
to access online network resources (Vij et al., 2014). The permissions sets are based upon 
security policies developed by the IT department and will vary from organization to 
organization (Bertino, Bhatti, & Ghafoor, 2010). 
The fifth step is to make sure all data has integrity. Only those with the proper 
entitlement to the data should be able to modify the data. Once a network user has been 
granted authorization to network resources, it does not mean the user has full control over 
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those resources. Resource control or integrity is the process of protecting data and other 
network resources from accidental or intentional modification, additions, or deletion. 
Integrity rules are developed by data creators or managers in conjunction with an 
organization’s IT security policies (Camp & DeBlois, 2013). Decker and Martinenghi 
(2011) further identified integrity, along with confidentiality and availability, as a 
fundamental building block of a secure IdM system. 
The sixth step is to verify a user’s credentials to access to network resources. 
Ardagna, De Capitani, di Vimercati, Foresti, Paraboschi, and Samarati, (2010) stated that 
credentials are based upon a token that identifies a user to an information system. 
Ardagna et al. identified tokens as a unique identifier possessed only by an authentic user. 
These tokens include, but are not limited to, passwords, ID card, and/or biometrics 
(finger print, retinal scan, voice recognition, etc.). Any of the above, or a combination, is 
then used with a user ID to allow access to network resources (Camp & DeBlois, 2013). 
All of the above starts with user enrollment into the colleges IdM database. The 
first time a person interacts with an IdM system, the entity must go through enrollment 
(Vij et al., 2014). The enrollment process gathers data about the entity such as a person’s 
name. This data collection establishes initial access and authorization to a network. 
Enrollment occurs when a person is hired as an employee, accepted as a student, or 
chosen as a vendor or supplier (Camp & DeBlois, 2013). All these examples begin with a 
vetting process. This vetting process is missing when granting access to guests for 
network access. 
Lastly, is the ability of one organization’s ability to accept the IdM credentials of 
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another organizations. When multiple organizations accept each other’s credential they 
create a federation. A federation begins with an agreement between organizations upon 
standards and technology that will be used by all organizations in the federation (Jiang, 
Duan, Lin, Qin, & Zhang, 2011). This allows one organization to join with other 
organizations (a federation) to allow all users access to the organization’s resources. A 
federation identity is much like a passport. As long as one member of the federation 
accepts the identity credential, the credentials are accepted by all. Current examples of 
this are Microsoft’s .NET Passport and the Liberty Alliance federation (Bertino, & 
Takahashi, 2011). 
IdM in Use at Colleges and Universities 
IdM solutions at colleges and universities have traditionally been a joint venture 
between human resources, the registrar’s office, and the IT department. Neuenschwander 
and Gebel (2008) wrote about two universities that implemented their own in-house 
solutions. The University of Texas at Austin developed their own home grown IdM 
solution that integrated their human resource system with student records. This point to 
point feed was only effective with university data and depended wholly on data collected 
by the university. User information could not be verified against outside sources nor 
could the data be shared across multiple domains. 
The IdM solution installed at California State University (CSU) used a university 
wide directory system based on applications that store, sort, modify, and organize user 
data and system resources. CSU uses Microsoft Active Directory and Novell’s eDirectory 
to provide authentication and authorization to computer resources at the university 
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(Tipton & Krause, 2012). There are limitations to using a large scale directory system, 
such as data accuracy and access management. This limitation to a university wide 
directory system hindered the development of a holistic IdM solution at CSU. Roman, 
Najera, and Lopez, (2011) stated a holistic approach to IdM is important to the creation 
of a security framework across the university. This ensures user identification and access 
controls are appropriate to gain access to the system. 
Cyber Incursions at Colleges and Universities 
Cyber incursions using college computer resources have been used to change 
student grades, modify transcripts, and alter records. Other cyber incursions have caused 
theft of intellectual property and financial fraud (Murphy, 2014). According to a survey 
of more than 500 colleges and universities by The Chronicle of Higher Education and the 
Gartner Group hackers have accessed alumni, student, and financial information of nearly 
41% of the institutions (Stamper, 2012). For example, at UCLA 800,000 records of 
faculty, staff, employees, students, and alumni were hacked into during December of 
2006 (Gilbraith, 2012). Gilbraith also found problems at the City University of New 
York, Ohio University, the University of Texas, and Tufts University where hackers used 
cyber-incursions techniques to access personal information. 
These incursions into confidential data at colleges and universities cause privacy 
and security advocate organizations to question the integrity of IT systems and demand 
more thorough protections. As more and more institutional records are being kept 
electronically, these demands will increase (Sen, 2010). This survey also showed the 
transformation from traditional paper records to digital records created security 
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challenges to both identity protection and information privacy. These challenges 
emphasize the need for proper IdM systems. 
IdM Architecture at Colleges and Universities 
The ability to recognize individuals who are authorized to access resources and 
information on a network is the basic principle of all IdM architectures (Tipton, 2012). In 
the past, individual colleges and universities have used a multitude of IdM solutions. C 
Colleges and universities used isolated, federated, and central designs to develop network 
security even at the department level. Jensen (2011) identified isolated IdM systems as 
the most common IdM architecture. Isolated IdM systems function as both a credential 
provider and identifier for system users. This type of isolated IdM system has both 
positive and negative associations. Historically, isolated IdM systems are simple to 
implement, but difficult to administer. Ranga and Flowerday (2010) noted the barriers of 
an isolated IdM are the multitude of identifiers and credentials a user must remember and 
IT personnel must administer.  
Figure 3 displays an example of the drawbacks of an isolated IdM architecture. 
The most obvious drawbacks to an isolated IdM architecture are multi-passwords and 
multi-user names, different levels of password strength, and different reset methods. The 
likelihood of forgetting one or more user names or passwords increases with each 





Figure 3. The architecture of an isolated identity management system. (Permission to 
reproduce image) 
In response to the growth of isolated systems and its inefficient use of user names 
and passwords, an internal federated IdM architecture was developed. An internal 
federated IdM system shares components of credential and identifiers providers within all 
applications in a domain (Jensen, 2012). This allows IT managers to recognize a unified 
user name and password combination and share the combination across platforms. As 
long as one federated application recognizes a user name and password combination, all 
federated applications become available (Landua & Moore, 2012). Figure 4 shows this 




Figure 4. An example of a federated identity management system architecture. 
(Permission to reproduce image) 
Federated IdM architectures are being used today in college and university 
environments. The University of Wisconsin-Madison deployed an internal federated IdM 
architecture by segregating the organization by business areas such as financial aid, IT, 
counseling, and human resources. Each business area establishes and maintains its 
domain’s authentication, but participates in the campus wide federated architecture. This 
allows for university wide resource access while maintaining local control (Stunden, 
2006). 
The internal federated IdM architecture is much more efficient and effective for 
users than the isolated IdM architecture; however, there are still some problems. Cao and 
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Yang (2010) identified the largest problems as mapping. Mapping in a federated 
architecture requires matching multiple identifiers before the system can identify two or 
more identities as belonging to one user. Cao and Yang called this synchronization. 
Another problem occurs with confidentiality. Users should be assured that their 
information is exchanged and recorded only with their permission.  
Lastly is the centralized IdM architecture itself. The centralized IdM architecture 
has a single identifier and a single credentials provider. The single credential provider is a 
central repository for all users, groups, and service credentials. Figure 5 shows this 
configuration. All access is centrally administered which means that all local control is 
ceded to the IT department. Also, the entire system in a centralized IdM architecture is 
vulnerable to attack if only one user name and password is discovered by a non-
authorized user (Baldoni, 2012). This is a major concern for management in protecting 




Figure 5. A centralized identity management system architecture. (Permission to 
reproduce image) 
Federated centralized IdM architecture has been implemented at CSU-Long 
Beach (Crase, Malon, Manoharan, & May, 2006). CSU established both the infrastructure 
and policies of a federated IdM architecture that allowed all areas of the university to 
participate fully and created an environment that protected stored data including 
individual user names and passwords and data stored on university servers (Crase et al., 
2006). The biggest drawback is all business units have to develop adequate policies and 
procedures for accessing their applications and data. These standards need to meet 
minimal security standards and allow access across platforms to users requiring access 
from another unit (Jensen, 2011). 
Although there are problems with all the IdM solutions, there are three common 
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elements to all IdM solutions (Tipton & Krause, 2012). The authors described these three 
common elements to all IdM architectures as network security, computer/host security, 
and college wide services. All three of the common elements are important to a secure 
college network. Tipton and Krause (2012) emphasized the importance of performing a 
risk analysis on network security and developing proper security policies and procedures 
to minimize those risks. The authors identified additional risks associated with colleges 
as opposed to industry as the need for portability over many campuses and allowing 
access to those who are not formally recognized by the college. College students, 
professors, and administrators need to access campus resources from multiple locations. 
The State of Texas requires community colleges to open their facilities and resources to 
non-collage users or guests. This is a major challenge for management as the need for 
portability and openness leaves college networks vulnerable to cyber incursions, 
especially from guest users. 
Roman, et al. (2011) listed several benefits of college wide IdM systems. First, an 
IdM system helps manage user accounts and passwords. Second, directories limit the 
need for excess user names and passwords. Third, directories create a single 
authentication source for users to use across any application or service on the network. 
Fourth, directories reduce the amount of user names and passwords that must be 
remembered by the users. Lastly, account management is made much easier. Only one 
account needs to be changed when a user leaves the college or changes status. 
Challenges in IdM Implementation at Colleges and Universities 
Evans et al. (2004) wrote that implementing an IdM system is a delicate balancing 
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act between too little or too much access. One of the main purposes of IT at a college or 
university is to facilitate the free flow of information. Erecting high barriers to 
information will discourage use of these resources. Setting standards too low will leave 
the college systems open to abuse. Both of these scenarios run counter to the missions of 
colleges and universities. 
Finding this balance is further complicated by the unique services offered at 
community colleges and the individuals who use those services. Unlike industry where 
all employees go through a screening process prior to hire, a community college also has 
the additional population of students, alumni, and the general population who go through 
little to no screening prior to needing access to the college’s resources (Thain, 2005). 
Even with granting access by a stable to a semi-stable population or faculty and students, 
there are additional stresses that must be addressed when a semester begins and ends. 
Access to resources and data will need to change as students graduate, move to new 
classrooms, and transfer between campuses. Faculty access also needs to be changed each 
semester as classes are taught in different classrooms, with different students, and faculty 
move between campuses. These predictable cyclical changes require a holistic approach 
to IdM (Beckett, 2006). 
IdM requirements are further complicated by the legal environments (Warne & 
Chun, 2009). In 1974, the U.S. congress passed the Family Education Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA). This act generally protects student personal information and prohibits 
disclosure without the consent of the parents or guardians of the students (if a minor) or 
adult students who are pursuing degrees in colleges or universities. Student information 
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includes financial aid information and grades. The law also grants students the right to 
access, review, and make corrections to their records. While violations might not result in 
privacy rights litigation, the U.S. Secretary of Education established the Family Policy 
Compliance Office tasked to investigate violations. Federal funding to the colleges can be 
revoked if colleges are found liable, (Francia & Hutchinson, 2014). 
There is also the Copyright Act of 1982 which clearly established that computer 
programs could be copyrighted. This confers upon the copyright holder the right to 
reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works based on it, and to distribute 
copies of it to the public by sale or transfer of ownership such as leasing or lending. 
Moreover, it prohibits unauthorized copying and distribution of copies (Johnson, 2000). 
Generally, copyright laws help to motivate the creator to continue creating works 
without fear of losing the proprietary value of their works when distributed publicly. 
These laws protect the creator’s work from “mutilation and deformation” (Hunter, 2005, 
p. 1). The copyright laws grant intellectual property rights to creators when they register 
their works formally with their home country’s intellectual property rights regulators. The 
law grants exclusive rights to the artists or creators extending from fifty to seventy years 
after the death of the artist. The law stipulates that the copyright owner can allow or 
disallow others from “1) reproducing; 2) distributing; 3) renting; 4) recording; 5) 
performing in public; 6) broadcasting; 7) translating; and 8) adapting the work or copies 
of the work” (Hunter, 2005, p. 1). 
There are some underlying problems of copyright law when applied to computer 
applications. Copyright law only covers the source program and object program; it does 
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not grant the right to control the algorithm. Copyright law “does not extend protection for 
an original work of authorship to any ideas, procedures, process, and system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery” (Johnson, 2000). Thus, when anyone can 
grasp the underlying concepts and conduct reverse engineering, the original author cannot 
claim ownership from which the new application was based. 
In the United States Copyright Act, Section 106, limits the rights of the Internet 
users to access, store, and distribute digital materials like “images, sounds, words or data” 
(Hunter, 2005, p. 1). The Court finds that a violation of intellectual property rights begin 
when the data or materials are stored temporarily in the computer’s RAM. Internet users 
knowingly or unknowingly violate the copyright act whenever they store or capture data 
from the web. The Court also found that ISPs are also culpable when their customers use 
their platform to transmit, disseminate, or access information from the web. The law 
states “copyright infringement is a form of strict liability” (Hunter, 2005, p. 1). 
According to Hunter (2005), an individual does not need knowledge and intent to violate 
a copyright. Thus, enforcement of a copyright law may attach liability to an ISP. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 or HIPAA plays 
a role in information security if the college collects or keeps medical data on employees 
or students. This act affects information security in three ways. First, it requires 
organizations to develop and use information security policies and procedures to protect 
and maintain health care information. Second, it requires a periodic comprehensive 
assessment of the policies and procedures set up by the organization to regulate their 
information security system. Third, it provides guidelines for electronic signatures, user 
36 
 
authentication, and non-repudiation (denial of authenticity). HIPPA does not provide 
specific procedures for the use or implementation of security technologies for each of the 
security requirements. It only states that security must be implemented to ensure the 
privacy of the health records and information. 
Colleges and universities are unique in their requirements of having intellectual 
and academic freedom coexisting alongside user confidentiality and privacy requirements 
(Oblinger, 2003). IdM solutions must also be able to scale to multiple types of users, both 
affiliated and non-affiliated, who use network resources. An effective IdM solution for 
colleges and universities also must take into account legislation such as FERPA, HIPPA, 
and copyright laws to control access to network resources and safeguard data. 
Role Identity Model 
According to Lancianese (2005), the role identity model is another governing 
principle behind IdM. Role identity modeling enables an individual’s identity according 
to the role the individual serves in the organization. In this situation, the organizational 
framework of the institution plays a major role. At a community college role categories 
can include faculty, staff, administrators, students, vendors, or guests. Each of these 
categories can be subdivided into subgroups. The personal profile allows group members 
to be modified to meet the specific need of the individual user.  
Periodically, the access requirements of these roles will require modification or 
change. Each semester the access needs for faculty and degree seeking students add 
additional stresses that must be addressed when a semester begins and ends. Access to 
resources and data will need to change as students graduate, move to new classrooms, 
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and transfer between campuses. Faculty access also will need to be changed each 
semester as classes are taught in different classrooms, with different students, and faculty 
move between campuses. These predictable cyclical changes require a holistic approach 
to IdM (Beckett, 2006). 
The IdM Paradigm 
The IdM paradigm is defined by three functions: the pure identity paradigm, the 
user access or logon, and the secure paradigm (Lips, Taylor, & Organ, 2006). The pure 
identity paradigm does not depend on roles or user classifications. The pure identity 
model uses biometrics such as finger prints, voice recognition, or retinal scan. This has 
become more popular today because more and more devices are being manufactured with 
biometric reading devices as a standard. Lips et al. pointed out that although the 
information is classified, the U.S. government is the largest user of pure identification. 
IdM solutions are used by colleges and universities to integrate their processes, 
policies, procedures, and technologies to facilitate and control access to critical systems 
and resources. IdM not only allows access, but also protects stored information from 
unauthorized access (Lips et al., 2006). An IdM solution consists of administration over 
user authentication, access rights and restrictions, account profiles, passwords, and other 
identification attributes. Lips et al. also stated that an IdM system once installed will 
facilitate new convergence of systems and resources when they are added, updated, or 
changed. A true IdM system should integrate all network and data resources. This list 
contains, but is not limited to devices, network equipment, portals, content, applications, 
and products as well as the user’s credentials, address books, preferences, entitlements, 
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and telephone numbers (Tipton & Krause, 2012). The service paradigm is used at 
colleges and universities with convergence technology to upgrade, modify, and change 
network data via online services. Services include updates to devices, network 
equipment, portals, content, application, products, credentialing, preferences, 
entitlements, and even phone numbers (Lips et al., 2006). 
IdM Implementation Challenges  
 There are several challenges to implementing an IdM system. Baldoni (2012) 
stated that the largest challenge to an IdM solution is convincing stakeholders of the 
needs and benefits of an integrated IdM system. The other challenges include developing 
proper business procedures, upgrade and maintenance, and the lack of support from 
community college leadership. It is interesting to note that these challenges are some of 
the same challenges of change management (Fisher-Hubner, 2008). Successful change 
management includes understanding and acceptance by organization members, proper 
planning, buy in by top management, and proper training and motivation of those 
affected by the change. All these are critical to successful change management. Lips et al. 
(2006) also listed a lack of proper testing and inadequate focus on long term IT 
infrastructure planning as additional challenges. 
Johnson (2000) stated that community colleges and universities across the country 
face increased competition for students. Since 1960, the number of community colleges 
in Texas has quadrupled (Hudson, 2008). Along with this increase in competition comes 
increased scrutiny by State and Federal governments regarding data security and privacy. 
This scrutiny has forced community colleges and universities to enact IdM policies and 
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procedures to avoid fines, penalties, and further regulations. Johnson noted that many 
community colleges and universities have found answers to IdM requirements in service-
oriented architecture (SOA) or a combination of SOA with organizational needs. Since 
SOA is platform independent it can be used by different departments to meet multiple 
needs. Departments are now free to develop solutions independent of the IT department 
and stay within compliance. Departments do not have to wait on IT to respond to 
changing markets (Johnson, 2006). 
Johnson (2006) further stated use of SOA by community colleges and universities 
has enabled fast response in the IT environment while requiring fewer IT resources. 
Information technology departments also use SOA in the integration of resources. This 
allows for better data consistency and ensures compliance with regulations such as 
FERPA. Johnson noted there are pros and cons to SOA. The largest benefit is speed and 
agility when integrating heterogeneous platforms. The largest drawback is that it leaves 
data vulnerable to security breaches during the process. Potential data breaches can occur 
even when the IT system’s architecture is closed or proprietary. At risk are the web 
applications and internal business functions used by students, faculty, vendors, and 
suppliers.  
Johnson (2006) further pointed out that breaches to online systems such as 
marketing services, online access to grades, personal data, registration services, medical 
information, financial aid information, and admissions records, may occur. These risks 
can be reduced with a proper IdM solution. A properly implemented IdM solution 
increases institutional effectiveness and efficiency; increases compliance to regulatory 
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requirements; facilitates improved security for authorization to data, services, and 
resources; reduces fraud, and improves reaction time to system changes (Mesmer, 2009). 
Lips et al. (2006) also pointed out that IdM solutions have a high rate of return on 
investment. The authors stated that organizations just utilizing auto-provisioning an 
organization with 10,000 employees can see annual savings of over a million dollars. 
Savings can also be recognized by a decrease in personnel, system downtime, and data 
breaches. Other potential savings occurred in the reduction of potential litigation. The 
author based these savings on a calculation that assumed an average reduction of 47% in 
management of user access and help desk inquiries. 
Lips et al. (2006) also noted IdM problems stem from the traditional IT 
architecture which began by managing small groups of non-related users. As the groups 
grew and resources need to be shared, both inside and outside of the organization, 
traditional IT management broke down. A good example of this is multi-user names and 
passwords a student or faculty member needed to remember in order to access multiple 
system resources. One user name and password combination was needed to login to a 
college’s network, another user name and password was needed to login to an e-mail 
account, and then another user name and password combination was needed to access 
student records, and so on. Each user name and password combination had its own set of 
minimum acceptable rules for creation and expiration. Rarely were the two systems’ rules 
the same. A forgotten user name and password required the services of the IT 
department’s help desk to verify user credentials and issue a new user name and 
password. This use of IT resources has a very low rate of return. Lips et al. (2006) stated 
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the reason for this inefficiency is due to “treating IdM as a separate and distinct solution 
often inserted into applications as needed post deployment” (p. 212). 
Lips et al. (2006) further observed that the primary IdM problem at community 
colleges and universities is the manner in which access is granted to applications. 
Systems that worked independently on a small scale were expected to work 
interdependently on a large scale. This was rarely, if ever, the case. Management of 
password growth and integration became unmanageable because each application had its 
own policies and procedures for user name and password. This independence worked 
well on the small scale; however, with growth, integration, auditing, and compliance 
issues made this independence unacceptable. Lips et al. (2006) concluded that the current 
independent IdM systems used by many applications must be replaced by enterprise wide 
systems that are stronger, more adaptable, and consistent with cross-platform IdM 
solutions. Continuous improvement to integrated IdM solutions will require buy-in from 
the community college’s top management. It will also require additional human and 
financial resources. Larger colleges have more of each and can set benchmark standards 
for smaller colleges. Once larger colleges have integrated solutions in place, smaller 
colleges can implement integrated IdM solutions that will fit the college’s needs. 
Lederer, Hong, Dey, and Landay (2004) also wrote extensively about the 
problems with early IdM solutions. The authors concluded that the difficulty in creating a 
proper IdM solution was in its meaning. There are multiple interpretations of the word 
privacy. This ambiguity led to multiple solutions across multiple platforms and 
applications. Lederer et al. further stated that research in the technical and design issues 
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of IdM must be addressed. The authors’ concerns were groupware privacy practices, 
access to multimedia environments, e-mail, file sharing systems, and virtual private 
networks. Their research led to findings that independent IdM systems are problematic to 
users and IT managers due to improper or antiquated designs. These system designers can 
avoid these IdM problems or pitfalls and create meaningful IdM solutions based on 
modern IdM conventions. The authors recognized five pitfalls in many older IdM 
solutions: 
1. Obscuring potential information flow – Systems should make clear who and 
when data might be conveyed to a third party. This can be done in clear 
security policies. 
2. Obscuring actual information flow - Systems should make clear when data are 
actually conveyed to a third party. This can be done with pop-up messaging 
boxes when data are transferred to a third party. 
3. Emphasizing configuration over action – Systems should use simple 
configuration when creating and maintaining privacy. Users should be 
educated about data sharing and be able to interact with the system. 
4. Lacking course-grained control as related to action – Systems should give 
users an obvious method to opt out or limit data as it is being transferred. 
5. Inhibiting establishing practice as related to action - Systems should not have 
different practices for data transfer in similar situations.  
Identity management systems have two major problems that should be resolved 
regarding privacy and cold start issues. These issues are not new (Koch & Moslein, 
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2005). Pentafronimos, Karantjias, and Polemi (2011) continued this research. Privacy is a 
control issue and can be reduced or eliminated by placing controls on identification 
information in the hands of the user. Cold start issues can be solved by allowing users to 
re-use identification information held on servers instead of re-entering all data. This is 
only possible if users understand and separate the utilizations of identity data and storage 
of the identity data. 
Pentafronimos et al. stated that separating identity usage from identity storage 
makes it possible to re-use identity data. User data can be stored and accessed in a single 
location. The authors pointed out that this is not unique to IdM. People give out, limit, 
and change identification data all the time in real life. Casual acquaintances do not have 
the same amount of personal data as a closely held friend. Some people even change the 
identity data they share. Some people will use a nickname in one social setting or with 
one group, but use their given name in others. By using this as a launching point for IdM 
systems, users can create different identities for the different roles associated with their 
personal data and decide which data will be transferred in those different situations. This 
type of IdM would empower users to maintain their own identity information and control 
how that information is being distributed.  
IdM Applications 
Donnet, Gueye, and Kaafar (2010) stated that most IdM researchers focused their 
efforts on user profiling and IdM application and solutions. User profiling involves 
source coordination of data on a network. Each node on a network sends and receives 
data. Nodes receiving data should be able to determine if the source node is a legitimate 
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node or a mischievous node. IdM application and solutions assist network administrators 
in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating user identification across a network. These 
applications and solutions are established into two categories: client-based profiles 
management and server-based IdM solutions. 
Infomediaries: According to Pentafronimos et al. infomediaries can be stored 
locally (client-side) and data can be distributed as needed. This solution will keep data 
near the user and increases trust by allowing the user to control and monitor the usage of 
their identity data. These infomediaries are small applets located on the client computer 
that allow users to manage their data and create auto fill-ins for Web forms. The main 
drawback of this solution is an infomediary is not portability. Also, current configuration 
of infomediaries is too complex for an average computer user to use on a daily basis. 
Single Sign-On and Server-Based User Profile Databases: Server-based solutions 
solve the problem of portability; however, they add complexity. Multiple servers are 
required in a trusted environment. A single sign on (SSO) allows applications stored on 
multiple servers in multiple locations access sufficient identification information about a 
user even if the user does not initially login to the application. Pentafronimos et al. stated 
many software vendors use SSO for intranet and extranet applications. This service is 
made possible through the X.500 directory services standard or through the light weight 
access protocols (LDAP). These solutions are casually proprietary, requiring uniform 
software and hardware. Global solutions available via the Internet require trusted third-
parties such as Microsoft’s Passport or Liberty Alliance.  
Pentafronimos et al. listed the core of an SSO solution as a centralized user profile 
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directory accessible via a Web interface. An SSO is certified by accessing a profile stored 
on a centralized data server and is accessed when a user logs into an application. The two 
most popular SSO solutions are Microsoft’s Passport and the Liberty Alliance Project. 
The authors stated that both of these SSO solutions are widely used by consumers, but 
stress the two are not the only solutions. 
Microsoft Passport: Pentafronimos et al. described Microsoft’s Passport as a suite 
of services that authenticate users across a number of applications. The Passport SSO 
service solves the authentication problem for users by allowing them to create a single set 
of credentials that will enable users to sign into any cite that supports a Passport service. 
As a part of the SSO service, users can store commonly used information in a Passport 
profile and transmit it to the participating cites they visit. This reduces the barriers to 
acquiring users because new users are not required to retype information when they 
register at a new cite. It also enables the sites visited to customize and enhance their 
experience without having to prompt the user for information. In essence, this centralized 
user identity management system provides a competitive advantage for Microsoft and 
gives free access for all Microsoft customers. 
Pentafronimos et al. stated the biggest drawback to Microsoft’s Passport is the 
requirement of users to agree to share identity information in order to participate in the 
Passport services. Once a person signs up with Passport they no longer are in control of 
their data or how it is used. This lack of control has led to security issues and privacy 
concerns. Problems occurred with eavesdropping during redirects and the ability to steal 
authentication tokens have been major issues with Passport. 
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Liberty Alliance: Pentafronimos et al. stated the Liberty Alliance Project is an 
alliance of more than 150 companies, including nonprofit and government organizations 
around the globe. Interestingly enough, the alliance does not include Microsoft. The 
consortium is working on an open standard for federated network identity that supports 
all current and emerging network devices. Federated identity is supposed to offer 
businesses, governments, employees, and consumers a more convenient and secure way 
to control identity information in today's digital economy. The authors stated the goal of 
the Liberty Alliance is not to create an electronic environment where identity data can be 
shared among members, but to confirm or deny the credentials of personal information 
when used to log into a member’s application or service.  
Members of the Liberty alliance are able to share access to, or gain 
interoperability among, disparate IdM protocols. This shared access is commonly known 
as a circle of trust. Members must have a well-defined agreement between the service 
providers, notify users when their data is being accessed, and have user consent when 
collecting information to participate in the circle of trust (Pentafronimos et al., 2011). 
Web Service Federation: Pentafronimos et al. noted that missing from the Liberty 
Alliance are two big players in the computer industry: Microsoft and IBM. These two 
companies have formed the Web Services Federation. This uniform approach to Web 
services environment focused on a security based architecture. This service provides 
protocols for attaching identification and security cookies to data transferred throughout 
the Internet. Web Services Federation extends the trust standards throughout all 
federation members and services through a SSO.  
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Profile Information Exchange: This commercial service synchronizes user profile 
data that can be exchanged through an electronic business card setup by the user. 
Members enter their data into a replicable database which makes a subset of all data 
viewable to other members (Pentafronimos et al., 2011). Profile Information exchange is 
an IdM solution that uses a decentralized, distributed approach to data storage (Bhargay-
Sparntzel et al., 2005). This model uses a distributed protocol for information sharing. 
Distributed protocols increase security and avoid many of the security issues of a 
centralized database. Users are responsible for entering and updating their own 
information. As long as the data is part of the federation, all information is presumed 
accurate. User data, or attributes, can now be used in a SSO identification model. User 
attributes are protected from identity theft by combining the user’s data with ordinary 
data. 
Integrated Support 
An IdM solution is not a small project and it is always part of a larger system. 
Dixon (2005) emphasized as the size of a project increases so does its complexity. 
Systematic approaches must be used to limit resources needed to complete the project. To 
develop an IdM system, an organization needs six key components: allocate costs, 
develop schedules, identify available resources, ensure product quality, evaluate 
functionality, and maintain optimal performance. Dixon (2005) also identified three 
additional areas needed for extensive management and support: human resources, 
resource management, and budget management. All resources are limited including 
human resources. Quality human resource management, actual resource management, 
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and budget management ensure that all resources used on the project are used correctly 
and efficiently. 
Both technology and human resources are needed to maintain a secure network. 
Understanding the balance has been an issue in the IT department for decades. According 
to Barati et al. (2013), many organization managers believe an IdM system can do all the 
thinking and analysis needed to protect a computer network. The authors saw this as a 
natural response to the lack of skilled security professionals and the high cost of training 
IT professionals in security management. Automated IdM systems are adequate for vetted 
system users such as employees, students, and vendors. Those outside of the vetting 
process, such as guests, can only be given authorization to use system resources from 
trained analysts. Successful IdM solutions need both technical and human resources 
solutions. Both of these requirements need to fit within budgetary constraints of the 
organization. 
Mobile IdM Systems 
Access to the Internet on college campuses is becoming more and more wireless. 
Wireless IdM solutions brings with it new and unique IdM requirements. Mobile IdM 
systems communicate using role-based access control (RBAC) as well as providing 
identification information. RBAC protocols will work on almost all mobile devices from 
smart phones to laptops (Blakely, 2009). Most community colleges in Texas limit 
wireless access only by range. Identity is rarely an issue when accessing a wireless access 
point. The major benefit of an RBAC is in providing identification to system users 
requesting access to resources. These benefits do come with extra costs and additional 
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infrastructure (Chen, Lin, & Hou, 2011). 
The main benefit to the audit trail of users’ activities was to protect against law 
suits at community colleges. Other benefits are account creation and deletion, the ability 
to break down barriers between data silos, and better management of user data. 
Limitations were usually associated with institutional applications. Identity management 
loses scalability when applications were setup as standalone applications which cannot 
participate in an IdM solution. The solution will come over time as many of the 
standalone applications are abandoned, updated, or merged into suites that allow SSO 
(Sen, 2010). Until that time, many IdM solutions will remain complex and expensive to 
implement. Along with these limitations was a lack of granulation and an all-or-nothing 
approach to SSO access. Fine grain access controls that allow full or partial access need 
role definitions as part of the IdM solution. This type of fine grain access currently was 
only accessible outside of an IdM solution. 
Another obstacle to a true IdM solution was mapping to existing identification 
data. Users of one IdM solution may not have their data in a location or format accessible 
to the new IdM solution. This problem became more complex as the organization grew 
and the number of additional IdM solutions go online (Camenisch et al., 2011).  
Barrère, Hurel, Badonnel, and Festor (2013) estimated the high cost to integrating 
mobile IdM solutions. The authors estimated from $20 to $30 per user for a mobile IdM 
solution and an additional $40 to $180 for integration. These costs are high, but more and 
more colleges and universities are moving to mobile IdM solutions. Along with the 
improved security and privacy, an IdM solution also provides tracking and auditing 
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functions required in FERPA, HIPPA, and SOX (Camenisch et al., 2011). In these 
situations legal compliance is driving IdM solutions, not ROI or innovation. Once a 
regulation requirement has been placed into law, college presidents, CIOs, and trustees 
cannot avoid adhering to compliance issues. 
Wilson and Tharakan (2008) and Camenisch et al. (2011) agreed that the future of 
IdM will include mobile components and be adaptable to rapid change in requirements 
and technology. Community college CIOs will need to keep pace with this rapid change 
and allocate technical, labor, and financial resources to meet the challenges to their 
institutions. 
Recent Contributors 
IdM solutions for corporations and governments have been the focus of much 
research over the past several years. However, solutions for community colleges and 
universities are few and far between. Tipton and Krause (2012) studied IdM solutions 
currently being used by community colleges and universities. Their work focused on how 
the IdM solution was designed, developed, implemented, and updated. Luallen and 
Labruyere (2013) also studied IdM solutions at community colleges and universities and 
found them outdated, inefficient, and actually posed a threat to IT infrastructures.  
Reviewing current IdM literature from 2005 to 2014 reflects a change from earlier 
IdM research. Early IdM research focused on a one size fits all approach. As of 2014, 
research pointed out the challenges community colleges and universities face because of 
the wide breath of services provided and the needs of the diverse population served. Scott 
and Johnson (2011) identified students, faculty, staff, alumni, and applicants as unique 
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and consistent users of resources of community colleges and universities. Scott and 
Johnson’s research additionally identified guests, vendors, and mobile users as partial 
users of unique systems. Each of these has unique needs. 
The goal of this research was to advance the practice, knowledge, and 
understanding of IdM in the IT field in overcoming current problems. Protecting data, 
applications, and hardware, as well as providing an audit trail became mandatory in many 
cases. Reaching this goal will advance access to community college resources to a wider 
community with less risk. This goal can be reached as long as access is secure, safe, and 
auditable resulting in increasing access to community college resources far beyond 
current traditional community college needs (Luallen & Labruyere, 2013). 
Anonymity and Crime 
In 1988, Morris, a graduate student at Cornell University, drove across Cambridge 
Massachusetts to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to launch what would 
become the first Internet worm. Within days, nearly a quarter of the computers on the 
Internet no longer worked. Morris was only found because he turned himself into 
authorities. He did not expect this type of large scale damage to the computers (Sudduth, 
2001). When asked why he launched the worm from MIT instead of Cornell, Morris 
stated that he wanted to disguise the fact that he was the author (Newman, 1991). Since 
that time, there have been many such individuals who derive a strange satisfaction from 
anonymously causing disruption and damage to computer systems. 
Broadhurst, Grabosky, Alazab, and Chon (2014) identified anonymity as a key 
component in criminal activities. They differentiated true anonymity from pseudo-
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anonymity. True anonymity occurs when it is impossible to identify a person. Examples 
of true anonymity range from unsigned letters to criminals using masks. Pseudo-
anonymity occurs when it is difficult to ascertain identity. Examples include reporter’s 
sources, membership lists, whistle blowers, and witnesses to crimes. Criminal activities 
fall primarily into the true anonymity category (Broadhurst et al., 2014). 
Anonymity is not unique to the Internet; however, the Internet offers unique 
opportunities. Kang, Brown, and Kiesler (2013) wrote extensively about anonymity and 
the Internet. The authors noted that the identity of Internet users is not directly tracked in 
many systems. Messages on the Internet are tracked through IP addresses. These IP 
addresses are issued to identify equipment on the Internet, not to identify individuals. 
Even individuals who purchase IP addresses through their Internet service provider (ISP) 
can hide their identity by sending messages through anonymous servers. The Internet 
does not check personal identification. Even third party service providers, such as 
hotmail, allow pseudonyms. The authors agreed there is a place for anonymity on the 
Internet; however, this anonymity should only extend to users on the Internet who use 
their own equipment. Information sent through the Internet can only be tracked back to 
the sending computer, not to an individual without proper identity management (Kang et 
al., 2013). 
Many IdM researchers agreed with this assessment. Evans et al. (2004) wrote that 
implementing an IdM system is a delicate balancing act between too little or too much 
access. One of the main purposes of IT at a college or university is to facilitate the free 
flow of information. Erecting high barriers to information will discourage the use of 
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network resources. Setting standards too low will leave the college’s systems open to 
abuse. Both of these scenarios run counter to the missions of colleges and universities. 
Finding this balance was further complicated by the unique services offered at 
community colleges and the personnel who use those services. Unlike industry, where 
employees go through a screening process prior to hire, a community college also has the 
additional population of students, alumni, and the general population who go through 
little to no screening before accessing the college’s resources (Scott & Johnson, 2011). 
Even with granting access to a stable or semi-stable population of faculty and degree 
seeking students, there are additional stresses that must be addressed such as when a 
semester begins and ends. Access to resources and data needed to be changed as student’s 
graduate, move to new classrooms, or transfer between campuses. Faculty access also 
need to change each semester as classes are taught in different classrooms, with different 
students, and faculty move between campuses. These predictable cyclical changes require 
a holistic approach to IdM (Beckett, 2006). 
Liability Issues in Internet Usage 
Whitman, Townsend, and Hendrickson (1999) asked two very interesting 
questions; What if an organization does not support or even encourage strong ethical 
conduct on the part of its users?  What if an organization does not behave ethically?  The 
authors postulated that there can be liability even if there is no criminal conduct. 
Liability, or an entity's obligation to do something, can be applied to personal conduct 
even when no law or contract has been breached. The authors defined liability as a 
wrongful act which includes the obligation to make payment or restitution compensation 
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for the wrongful act.  
Liability can be placed on an organization if an employee commits an illegal or 
unethical act that causes harm. This is true even if the employee is acting with or without 
authorization. This liability can increase if the organization does not have policies and 
procedures in place (Youngdale, 2009). These policies and procedures are called due care 
(Gallegos, 2002). Due care not only means that the organization has policies and 
procedures in place, but that these policies and procedures have also been communicated 
to employees. This ensures that every employee knows what behavior is acceptable. Due 
care also includes the consequences for unacceptable behavior. Gallegos (2002) indicated 
that true due care occurs when an organization makes constant efforts to inform and 
educate their employees about the policies and procedures. Because of the Internet, it is 
possible that a person could be wronged by an organization from anywhere in the world. 
Due care has become very important to the protection of organizations. 
Information Security Policy for an Organization 
All organizations, especially large organizations, need to have policies, 
procedures, and practices for their employees to follow. These activities came from 
industry best practices, governmental regulation, and customer requirements. 
Development and implementation of community college information security policies are 
defined in this section. Organizational information security policy literature is examined 
to discover institutional security policies and how structural and functional features are 
developed to secure an organization. 
There are different approaches in developing policies which strive to solve broad 
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political, social, and organizational problems to serve the public good or advance 
organizational goals. Even with the different approaches, most strive to increase 
efficiencies and effectiveness of the organization (Colebach, 1998). Organizational 
policies are an attempt to standardize business practices, both internal and external, that 
act as guidelines to describe how an organization’s personnel should behave in a given 
situation. These policies should support the organization’s strategic goals and objectives 
by maximizing the organization’s efficiencies and strengthen the effectiveness of the 
organization’s resources (Browne, 1997). 
An organization’s information security policies are developed around functional 
areas. Organizational information security policies begin with a statement of the 
organization’s beliefs, goals, and objectives developed at the top level of management 
(Peltier, 2013). These policies should also describe how the objectives of protecting the 
organization’s assets will be obtained. Lastly, these policies should address how the 
organizational resources will be used and protected. 
Creating policies to protect an organization is not a new issue. Administrators 
have created organizational policy for many years. Moore (1994) described three levels at 
which organizational policies should be addressed: industrial, organizational, and 
societal. Each level has its own construction and elements. Moore gave five elements that 
should be present at the organizational level for constructing information policies: 
1. Information technology: Addresses the information systems development to 
handle current and new technology integration into the organization. 
2. Information markets: Addresses how the organization will handle access to 
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information external to the organization. 
3. Information engineering: Addresses the design of the information systems.  
4. Human resources: Addresses the skill levels needed by personnel using the 
organization’s information system.  
5. Legislation and regulation: Addresses the issues associated with 
organizational compliance to the legal and regulation environment. 
These organizational security elements should then be used as directions for 
guiding and developing the technical security policies for implementation. Baskerville 
and Peltier (2013) identified two categories related to organizational security policies. 
The technical or computer security category is the first. This category dealt with securing 
the information architecture, access control to the organization’s computer system, and 
other security mechanisms needed to keep the organization’s computer system from 
harm. Most of this category is technology driven. The category defined how new 
technology, both hardware and software, should be integrated into the organization. 
Security management was the second category and deals with social issues concerning an 
organization’s security. This category focuses on an organization’s security governance, 
access and/or restrictions for users, and system design. An organization’s information 
security policy is the foundation document for information security managers. These 
policies must support the mission, vision, and objectives of the organization as well as 
guiding the behavior of the institution’s personnel regarding information security (Hone 
& Eloff, 2002). 
One of the primary purposes of organizational security policies is to make sure 
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that user rights, privileges, responsibilities, and duties are within the organization’s 
control (Hong et al., 2006). In this sense, organizational security policy creates the proper 
user guidelines that describe the proper environment and behavior for accessing an 
organization’s information system. According to NEC Unified Solutions (2002), 
compliance was another function of an organizational security policy. NEC defined 
compliance as an organization’s security policy that focuses on meeting external 
regulation placed on the organization by legislative bodies. 
Information security policies should also describe and develop the groundwork 
for all activities surrounding security programs of the organizations (Walton, 2002; Hone 
& Eloff, 2002). Additionally, information security policies should also function as to 
what Fitzgerald (1995) called the basic fundamental building blocks of development for 
information security. These policies should contain descriptions of all the supported 
programs of an organization’s information security infrastructure. 
The concept of organizational governance is a mature discipline. Methodology for 
creating organizational policies has been around for many decades. Karin (1983) 
described a four step process for developing organizational policies:      
1. Identify the issues: In this step an organization defines the information 
security problems that need to be address.  
2. Formulate an information policy: In this step an organization creates the 
policy statements that directs the behavior of the organization’s information 
system and how the organization will support these systems and services.  
3. Define the information policy area: In this step an organization identifies how 
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it will facilitate the decision making processes in the policy of information 
security.  
4. Establish information policy measures: In this step an organization creates the 
security policy metrics in which to measure information security policy 
effectiveness. 
Another view of organizational security policy came from Karyda, Kiountouzis, 
and Kokolakis (2005). The authors believed organizational security policies should be 
developed in three steps:   
1. Formulation: In this step, organizations decide the policy issues, develop 
policy standards, create policy statements around the standard, and create 
security performance measures.  
2. Implementation: In this step, organizations take the security policy, created 
above, and translate them into procedures or best practices to guide the 
organization when the security policies are implemented.  
3. Adoption: In this step, organizations formally adopt the policies and they 
become part of the normal operational practices of the organization.  
A fourth step was also identified by Garigue and Stefaniu, (2003) and expanded by Wiant 
(2005). These authors added a review step to Karyda, Kiountouzis, and Kokolakis’ list. In 
this step, organizations periodically examine their policies and assess their effectiveness.  
Creating information security policies has also been taken up by Doherty and 
Fulford (2006). These authors describe eleven critical elements an organization must 
identify when developing their information security policies. These authors took a more 
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technical approach by adding specific topics to address when creating information 
security policies: 
1. Personal usage of information systems: This element describes the rights and 
responsibilities of a user when accessing organizational information systems.  
2. Disclosure of information: This element describes the organization’s security 
policies individuals need to follow in order to access and disclose private data 
held by the organization.  
3. Physical security of resources: This element describes how the organization 
needs to protect the physical assets of the organization from theft or damages 
along with how the organization will protect their information system’s 
infrastructure.  
4. Violation and breaches of security: This element describes how the 
organization will recover lost data due to a security breach or disaster and how 
the organization will document their lost data.  
5. Prevention of viruses and worms: This element describes how the 
organization will protect against incursions from hackers, viruses, and worms. 
The policies should also address how the organizational users will handle e-
mail attachments and information sharing software.  
6. User access management: This element describes the requirements needed for 
users, both internal and external, to access information resources.  
7. Mobile computing: This element describes the use of mobile devices such as 




8. Internet access: This element describes the acceptable Internet access with 
respect to non-business related browsing.  
9. Software development and maintenance: This element describes the guidelines 
needed for software to meet for effective security controls across the 
information system.  
10. Encryption: This element describes the methodology to be used to encrypt 
information passing between user computers and organizational servers.  
11. Contingency/continuity planning: This element describes how the 
organization will recover from security breaches and disasters. 
Using an organizational approach for security policy development in higher 
education has two noted champions, Bruhn and Petersen (2003). The authors identified a 
void in policy development at universities and colleges when writing security policies for 
their institutions and they argued that top management should embed the informational 
security policies into their strategic governance structures. The security policies of 
colleges and universities should clearly define the institution’s purpose and scope for 
securing institutions resources. Security actors also need to be defined. The authors 
defined security actors as anyone with duties or responsibilities for the security of 
institution’s resources, equipment, or data. Each type of actor should have their own 
unique needs and requirements. These requirements need to be recognized and addressed 
by the college’s top management.  
The institution’s security policies should identify and describe the processes, 
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procedures, guidelines, best practices, and standards used by the institution regarding 
security. Organizational documents that describe security policies need to state clearly the 
acceptable behavior of users, both internal and external, when using organizational 
resources. The primary resource for the institution should be the organization’s security 
policy (Figure 6).   
Information Security Policies 
Additional Organization Policies 
Information Security Standards 
Guidelines and Working Papers 
 
Figure 6. Hierarchy of published documentation for information security policy.  
From an organizational approach, the college’s information security policy is a 
document that describes the security hierarchal structure. The organization’s information 
security policy should document the objectives and goals of the college. Figure 6 shows 
the security policy hierarchy for an organization. Bruhn and Petersen (2003) called this 
the organization’s pinnacle document of the organization regarding security strategies. 
Purser (2004) went further and identified four functions that all security statements must 
include. First, the organization’s information security policy should provide guidance to 
the organization on all security matters. Second, the organization’s information security 
policy should form the basis for the security control framework of the organization. 
Third, the organization’s information security policy should define the security roles and 
responsibilities within the organization. Lastly, the organization’s information security 
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policy should articulate the organization’s position on issues within the documents. 
Purser (2004) believed that following these four steps the organization would make its 
information security policy the essential component that will drive an organization’s 
security standards. 
Setting standards in an organization is not a new development. Weiner (1966) 
linked standards of the organization with IT and technology advances in research and 
development. Organizational standards could be created for many reasons from 
regulatory compliance to creating a competitive advantage for products and services 
(Kleblawi & Sullivan, 2007). Peltier (2013) went deeper with security standards as he 
believed that security standards play a vital role in guiding, monitoring, and supporting 
the information system of an organization. Security standards should also establish 
consistent, objective, and reliable security metrics to measure the effectiveness of 
security in an organization (Hajdarevic & Allen, 2013).  
Bennett and Schuster (2008) went even further and stated the combination of an 
organization’s security policy and security standards will establish the framework for 
information security programs in the institution. Thus, the establishment of security 
standards in an organization would create a baseline for security standards and form 
channels of communication to implement security best practices to support information 
security programs.  
Many IT and security professional organizations have created generic security 
standards. Though the entire list of standards is beyond the scope of this study, three 
important security standards are worth mentioning. First is the Control Objectives for 
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Business Information Technology (COBIT) targeted an organization’s business processes 
relating to security governance (von Solms, 2005a). Second is the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency of the Commerce Department, created 
several information security standards. The main security standard is SP800-100 (NIST 
Special Publication, 800-100, 2006). This standard provides guidelines for chief 
information officers (CIO) and other information security managers of federal 
departments regarding their responsibilities for creating, managing, enforcing, and 
evaluating the security infrastructure of an organization. 
Third is the International Organization of Standards ISO 17799. This international 
standards organization divides security management into five categories; strategy, 
technology, organization, people, and environment (Saleh, Alrabiah, & Bakry, 2005). 
These five categories can be broken into ten separate security processes that support the 
development and maintenance of an organization’s information security compliance. Any 
size organization can implement ISO 17799 and there is a certification process (Saint 
Germain, 2005). In 2005, the standard was expanded to information security management 
structure and controls identification and renamed ISO 27001. The new standard focused 
more on Deming’s plan, do, check, and act cycle that make measuring key performance 
indicators easier and more systematic (Humphreys, 2007; Boehmer, 2008). 
Information Security Governance in Higher Education  
In this section, the conceptual framework of information security governance was 
defined from an organizational perspective. The section concludes with an overview of 
information security literature that focused on colleges and universities.  
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Von Solms (2010) described the theoretical construct of information security 
governance as a series of waves. The first wave consisted of the IT component associated 
with information security or the technology framework. Second was the organization’s 
security structure or information security management. The third wave was concerned 
with how the organization institutionalizes information security. The author also stressed 
that information security governance does not exist in a vacuum. The information 
security governance framework existed within the regulatory environment of the 
institution. The authors agreed with Lindup (1996) that legal requirements were the first 
place security professionals should look when developing information security policies.  
Information security governance was the first step to information security 
management which leads to information security operations. This relationship needs to be 
more than just policy and procedures that reflect best practices. The relationship needs to 
be incorporated into the strategic planning of the institution along with the decision 
making process when it comes to protecting the information assets of the institution 
(Brotby, 2007). Strategic security planning requires the support of the institution’s top 
management (Pirani & Spicer, 2006). This is where creating an effective information 
security framework becomes a bigger challenge. Top administrators at academic 
institutions too often see security as an aside to the academic mission of the institution 
(Clark & Sitko, 2008). 
Moulton and Coles (2003) defined information security as “the establishment and 
maintenance of a controlled environment to manage the risks relating to confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information” (p. 581). Organizational use of best practices 
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for information security governance framework should not be limited to just user access. 
An organization’s information security governance framework needs to cover all aspects 
of information security. Von Solms (2005a) explained that information security 
governance as top management’s commitment to leadership, structure, awareness to 
policies, procedures, and practices involving IT technology. The author also stressed the 
use of enforcement mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
the organization’s IT and information assets. 
Regulatory compliance issues concerning information security management 
revolve around both internal and external drivers. Information security framework must 
ensure the information system processes of an organization comply with all governmental 
legislative and regulative requirements. This due diligence requirement was not new to 
organizations (Lindup, 1996). Part of an organization’s reasonability was to keep security 
practices aligned with governmental requirements (von Solms, 2006). From the 
standpoint of governmental compliance, the information security governance framework 
had the duty of managing organizational information risk with the governmental 




Figure 7. Information Security Governance Framework. (Permission to reproduce image) 
Information security governance can be viewed as a house (Da Viega & Eloff, 
2007). The above diagram (Figure 7) shows information security governance as the roof 
that covers strategic, managerial, operational, and technological functions of an 
organization. The strategic level was concerned with leadership and support of 
information security. Activities such as overall security planning for the organization 
were completed at this level. The managerial level was concerned with policy 
development and compliance, program development, standards, best practices, and 
privacy issues with information security. Lastly, the technical level was concerned with 
asset management and information integrity issues.  
Strategic planning and decision making were activities of information security 
governance (Garigue & Stefania, 2003). Both also played a significant role in regulative 
compliance for the organization. Another view of information security governance came 
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from de Oliveira et al. (2006). The authors argued that the primary responsibility of 
information security governance was to coordinate people, technology, and processes 
associated with the security of the organization. The main responsibility of information 
security governance is to create and support all information security activities of the 
organization. It should also clearly define the structure, roles, and responsibilities of all 
entities within the organization. Rosenblatt (2008) added that the responsibility of 
creating information security programs, such as risk assessment, compliance, asset 
monitoring and protection, security awareness, and educational programs, were also part 
of this process. 
Information security governance does not exist in a static environment. 
Information security was originally one of the responsibilities of the IT department. 
Security awareness and importance have seen an increase in significance in the past 
decade. Many organizations now have chief information security officers (CISO) whose 
primary responsibility is the information security of the organization. Some of the 
traditional security responsibilities of the CISO are policy development, education, 
awareness, investigation, and disaster recovery. Many CISOs also have taken on the 
responsibility of vendor relations (Whitten, 2008). The prototypical CISO has deep IT 
technical skills, strong communication skills, and leadership skills. 
Information security in academia has not been studied deeply and even fewer 
studies have looked at the security governance structure at colleges or universities. In one 
of the better studies, even though it is ten year old, Burd (2004) found that academic 
institutions were beginning to develop information security baselines. The study found 
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that the major information security challenge to an institution was a lack of security 
standards in higher education. The study found corporate information security models 
were not well suited for the academic environment. New information security models 
were needed to match the more open academic environment. The report also showed that 
top academic administrators were starting to view the subject of information security as 
an institutional issue, not just an IT department issue. 
Pirani and Spicer (2006) completed another case study of the information security 
programs at four universities. The case study examined the successful characteristics of a 
university’s information program. The study found that the top management of the 
institutions considered information security as an institutional issue. All the institutions 
had instituted formal security programs. Also, all four institutions had fully funded and 
staffed the IT security programs.      
Both studies found another similarity with the institutions. All the top 
administrators at the universities believed institutions of higher education were at a 
higher risk of security breaches because of the nature of the educational industry. The 
studies mentioned academic freedom, changing or multiple roles of users, open access 
requirements, and multi-location access as challenges to information security at their 
institutions. These issues seemed to be unique to higher education. 
The organization that was at the forefront of information security is EDUCAUSE. 
Kam, Katerattanakul, Gogolin, and Hong (2013) used two of EDUCAUSE’s studies from 
2003 and 2006 to see if colleges with information security compliance have increased 
over the years. The authors work focused on information security at colleges and 
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universities. These multiple method study examined the progression of information 
security in higher education over four years. The study found that information security 
management and leadership had shifted from an IT concern to an institutional and system 
concern. The study showed a shift from IT centric to an organizational/holistic approach 
to handling information security management at the institutions. The study found that all 
institutions had developed formal policies for information security structure. All 
institutions had implemented organizational or system wide security programs that 
focused on consistent standardized policies, procedures, and practiced. These information 
security procedures went so far as to describe individual training programs and develop 
centralized purchasing processes for IT employees. 
Changing a Law in Texas 
There were several solutions that have been suggested to solve the access 
problem. One solution was to change the law that grants guest access to community 
college resources. According to Amy Price, legislative director for State Senator Dan 
Patrick, there were several ways to change a law in Texas. The two most common 
methods were petition and request.  
The petition method was the most formal. An individual or group can start a 
petition drive on any issue by gathering signatures. The petition would then be submitted 
to the legislature once the number of signatures needed for the petition had been reached 
and verified. The number of signatures will vary depending on the subject matter and on 
the area that the law will effect. This calculation is defined in Texas statute section 
227.0024. For example, it could take as few as 50 signatures to change a city or local 
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ordnance and as many as 500,000 signatures to change a state law (Texas Legislative 
Council, n.d.). 
The second, and less formal, method was to find a legislator who is interested in 
changing or adding a law. Ms. Price stated there are many legislators who were elected 
on the promise to make specific changes. These legislators could be eager to help a 
citizen change a law. Both methods would get the issue into the legislative system; 
however, there is no guarantee the bill would be presented to the legislature, or passed by 
the legislature, or signed into law. According to the Texas State Legislature site, there 
were over 4453 bills proposed in the 2011 legislative session (Stiles and Swicegood, 
n.d.). Just over 700 were passed by both chambers and only 673 were signed into law 
(Texas Legistature, 2011). 
Many of these bills failed because passing a law may not be a singular matter. 
Many of the bills did not pass in previous legislative sessions because the bill did not pass 
through the Texas Legislative Council. The Texas Legislative Council checks the bill for 
related issues already enacted. One of the hurdles of changing the law for open access at 
community colleges is that it would require changes to the funding formula definition for 
community colleges. The funding formula allows community colleges to collect taxes 
from the local tax base for such issues as providing access to the local populace. Also, the 
charter of all community colleges in the state would need to be changed (Texas 
Legislative Council, n.d.). These hurdles make changing the law to restrict guest access 




Automation in Identity Management 
A second solution was to automate the process of gathering guest ID information 
and granting access to computer resources. From a technological standpoint, IT 
automation capabilities could be handled through an existing API such as Active 
Directory. Information technology departments can leverage this existing technology to 
automate college IdM systems (Ward, 2013). An automated IdM access system should 
offer a familiar and intuitive interface, such as an ATM or kiosk, for users requesting 
access and the flexibility to collect user information from multiple sources (Buchan, 
2013). This would allow ease of use for both those granting access to computer resources 
and those seeking access to computer resources. ATMs have been in wide use in the 
United States since the late 1970s. Using an ATM card and keying in a PIN number is 
common place in the banking industry. According to Lenpenzo (2012), there were nearly 
2 billion ATM transactions in 2012. This was more than half of all banking transactions 
that year. Kiosks for purchasing movie tickets or checking in at airline counters have also 
become common place (Kiosk Market Place, 2011). 
The Identity Security Project from the State of Iowa consists of a clearinghouse 
where various identity documents are linked together (Combs, 2002). These include birth 
certificates, Social Security number, driver's license, marriage license, and death 
certificates. This system allows multiple agencies to perform cross linked identity 
verification and provide better tracking for identity theft. The concepts of primary 
identification (PID) and secondary identification (SID) were used in this case. The birth 
certificate was the PID. This was the document that all other SIDs were associated. Only 
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SIDs that linked directly to a PID would be issued. At the same time, the birth certificate 
was electronically associated with all other SIDs issued in the future (State of Iowa, 
2004). 
Under this system, a more strict security check could be established when an ID 
was presented and a concurrent check was run against the department of transportation’s 
(DOT) database. Attempting to submit a second birth certificate would not be allowed 
since the PID was already on file. This identity management system incorporated an 
individual's picture ID, such as a driver’s license, with documentation and processes to 
prevent identity theft and fraud. 
As a state agency, Texas community colleges can access the Texas DOT database. 
A college can use a kiosk connected to the Texas DOT database to verify identification 
and link that identification to the college’s active services directory to issue a user ID and 
password. The college now has a valid identification linked to a user ID and can track 
guest access in the same manner as employees, faculty, and students (Texas Department 
of Transportation, 2009). 
Summary and Conclusions 
Identity management is a combination of policies, risk management controls, 
software, and hardware technologies. On the policy side, an organization must establish a 
system that enhances privacy, anonymity, emergency response, law enforcement, and 
cost saving. Once IdM policies are developed, technologies and architectures should be 
chosen that support the execution of the policies. It is important for security professionals 
to find creative ways to build an IdM system that provides liberties, privacy, and other 
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key policy imperatives. 
The identity management infrastructure model (IDIM), a sample identity 
management system, was presented in this section. While no exact implementation 
followed the IDIM, I found similar functionalities and components in all IdM solutions. 
A good IdM solution should always provide universal identity data access, workflow, 
delegated administration, detail auditing and logging, and modeling of the organization. 
Depending on the deployment, the IdM solution should also provide access control, 
provisioning, public key infrastructure (PKI) functions, networking, and Web services 
management. Identity management in the area of security has been gathering great 
momentum for further research.  
The information security governance framework was discussed. This section 
contained information regarding the different approaches for creating information 
security governance framework and how the discipline had matured from an IT 
department concern to becoming part of the organization’s mission guided by top 
management. The section concluded with a discussion on how information security 
governance framework was addressed in higher education and unique challenges facing 
colleges and universities when implementing security policies.  
Lastly, methods for solving this problem were presented. The two methods for 
changing the law requiring open access at Texas community colleges require passage in 
the Texas legislature. This process is long with many hurdles. Passing all the hurdles does 
not guarantee the bill will become a law. Automation technology for accessing guest 
identity information through the Texas DOT was also presented. This will simplify the 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
A discussion of the tradition of inquiry using the qualitative case study 
methodology, the research sample and population to be used, the method of data 
collection and procedures, data management procedures, method of data analysis, and the 
issues of ethical considerations are presented in this chapter. Research of existing 
literature indicated that there are laws and legal precedent that can hold community 
colleges liable for the misusage of their open computer labs (Galuszka, 2004). 
Professional organizations also have guidelines for the protection of data (Wang & 
McClung, 2011). Both the guidelines and laws emphasized the development of policies 
and procedures for protecting data from external and internal abuse.  
Much has been written regarding how organizations should identify users of 
network resources; however, these guidelines focus on employees, students, and vendors. 
I could find nothing written regarding allowing access to guests, those who were not 
registered in some manner with the college. Current methods used by community 
colleges in Texas to identify users of their network resources are the focus of this chapter. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Thirteen community colleges in Texas provided the basis for this study. This 
section began with identifying the study questions that guided the research. Next the 
participants are identified and data collection defined. Lastly, the criteria for interpreting 
the results are explained. The research questions are: 
RQ1. How do community colleges in the State of Texas implement an Identity 
Management (IdM) system that is capable of properly identifying guest users and 
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protecting the college from illegal acts such as inappropriate information access, 
hacking into other networks, launching computer viruses or Internet worms, or 
other white-collar crimes committed by guests using the college’s computer 
network?  From this central question, the sub questions to be answered to address 
the problem are:  
RQ2. What are the IdM methods used by IT managers at Texas community colleges to 
identify guests? 
RQ3. How affective are the IdM strategies used by IT managers at Texas community 
colleges in track guest users to improve the security of computer networks? 
RQ4. What do IT managers see as the difference between their current IdM practices 
and their ideal IdM system? 
Role of the Researcher 
Since I was the main collector of data for this research, I conducted the entire 
research from the stages of data collection, data analysis, to report writing. I traveled to 
the 13 community college listed to collect relevant data on the security of their open 
computer labs. I found all the participants to interview for the research and sought the 
necessary permission to conduct interviews and collect documents. I used e-mail and the 
telephone to contact all participants. I personally conducted and transcribed all 
interviews. These interview notes were used to aid the analysis of this report.  
According to Goulding (2002), a qualitative researcher must be a skillful 
interviewer in order to obtain relevant data required for the study. I was able to conduct 
this research based upon my work experience with over 20 years in the information 
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technology field. The experience was both in industry and academia. I worked in the IT 
department or related departments for two major hospitals in the Houston medical center 
for 10 years. My positions included IT focal, database manager, and consultant in the 
human resources department administering the applicant tracking submissions 
applications. For the last 15 years, I have held the position of professor of computer 
science for North Harris College. For the first 6 years, I was the assistant chair of the 
department and the lead instructor for the Net+ courses (Operating Systems, Introduction 
to Hardware, and Fundamentals of Networking). For the past 8 years, I have been the 
lead instructor for the largest class the department offers, Introduction to Computers. 
During the last 8 years, I have also worked for Our Lady of the Lake University - 
Houston as the IT manager and adjunct faculty teaching IT courses in both the graduate 
and undergraduate programs. 
Methodology 
The qualitative case study methodology was used as the primary method of 
inquiry. This inquiry was an in-depth multi-case study of the policies, procedures, and 
practices of 13 community colleges in Texas. The goal of this multi-case study was to 
develop guidelines for IT professionals who may use IdM practices for identifying guests 
using a college’s network.  
Yin (2009) defined a case study as an empirical analysis used to investigate a 
contemporary event(s) when the delineation between the occurrences and context is not 
readily apparent. Yin’s case study definition works well for this research. I did not know 
the current state of IdM policies, procedures, and practices at community colleges in 
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Texas. Yin stated that case studies are the research method of choice when asking how or 
why questions regarding an event. Again, the multi-case study method works well for this 
research. Before starting this research, I did not know how IdM policies were created or 
why there was a gap in the IdM literature. Yin (2009) also wrote about factors that favor 
choosing the case study method. These factors included focusing on contemporary events 
and issues that arise when the researcher’s control over the event(s) is limited and when 
the researcher wants to describe, understand, and explain an event. Identity management 
is a contemporary issue arising from the expansion of computer networks beginning in 
the late 1990s. Although I had no control over the creation or implementation of the IdM 
policies, I wanted to understand the process of creation and implementation of these 
policies (Halperin & Backhouse, 2007). 
Yin (2009) listed the three types of case study as exploratory, descriptive, and 
explanatory. Exploratory studies are used when a researcher can construct the research 
frame work, but has not defined the research question or the hypotheses. In this case, the 
research sets the question or hypotheses. Exploratory studies are also used when existing 
literature and research are limited. This type of study was not used because I already have 
research questions and a hypothesis. 
Yin (2009) described the descriptive case study starting with a descriptive theory 
that would cover both the depth and scope of the case study. In this situation, related 
patterns were only relevant if the patterns were defined before the research begins. Any 
pattern will be purely incidental as a result of the research. I did not use this type of case 
study because I believe there were patterns; however, I could not know the patterns until I 
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researched the 13 different and distinct community colleges’ IdM methods.  
The case study type used in this study is the explanatory study. The explanatory 
case study should be used when a researcher attempts to identify patterns and relate the 
variations of those patterns to each other (Yin, 2009). This type of case study answers the 
how and why questions that would explain an event. I used this type of case study 
because the focus of this inquirer was on how the IdM policies were created and why 
they were being (or not being) implemented by community colleges in Texas. Patterns 
were identified once the case study was completed. 
Yin (2009) also noted that the case study method is very useful in communicating 
research information to non-specialists, those who were not in the field of study. He 
stated that the case study, specifically the explanatory case studies, can convey 
information to individuals outside of or new to an industry. This benefit assisted my goal 
of linking policy and procedures to the practices used by employees. Yin’s insights 
worked well for this study. Top-level management often look to mid-level content 
experts to create the policies first drafts in order to form user level policies (Jones & 
George, 2012). For example, community college CIOs would look to IT professions to 
develop the first drafts of computer related policies. These policies will then need to be 
explained to executive committees and college leadership who are non-IT professionals. 
Once these policies receive top-level management approval, the policies will need to be 
explained to computer lab employees for implementation.  
Yin (2009) gave a frame work for designing a case study. He identified five 
components a researcher should use when building a case study. They were (a) 
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identifying the study questions, (b) setting the study propositions, (c) developing the units 
of analysis, (d) linking the data to propositions, and (e) setting the criteria for interpreting 
the results. The first three components lay the foundation to the case study and the last 
two components provide analysis of the data collected.  
In the first step, identifying the study questions, the researcher should develop the 
how and why questions that allow a researcher to achieve his or her goal. Second, a 
researcher should develop the study’s propositions. This is derived from the how and why 
questions and is the researcher’s tool that will focus the study (Yin, 2009). Third, is the 
development of the units for analysis. Here, a researcher defines what will be analyzed. 
The last two components are the data analysis framework of the case study, linking data 
to the propositions and selecting criteria for interpreting the findings. I followed this 
frame work. 
Participant Selection Logic 
The community colleges that were studied for this research were located in south 
east, north east, and central Texas. Thirteen of the 55 community colleges in Texas have 
been purposely selected as participants for the research. These 13 colleges fit into the 
Katsinas, Lacey, and Hardy classification (2006). This classification system is used by 
the federal and state governments to categorize community colleges for funding. The 
colleges were divided throughout the categories and they could be reached using limited 
resources. These 13 colleges also made up the vast majority of campuses and satellite 
campuses of the 55 community colleges in Texas. Between the 13 colleges, there were 45 
independent campuses and 40 satellite campuses. The IdM policies of these 13 colleges 
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made up nearly 36% of all the campuses and 59% of all the satellites of the community 
colleges in Texas (Texas Association of Community Colleges, 2010). 
The Katsinas, Lacey, and Hardy classification breaks community colleges into 
three categories: rural, suburban, and urban (Hardy & Katsinas, 2006). Katsinas et al. 
used the federal government’s Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA) and 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) to place community colleges into the three 
categories. Colleges located in a city that were included in a PMSA or MSA were 
considered urban. Colleges located in a city that were not included in a PMSA or MSA, 
but within the PMSA or MSA area were considered suburban. College located in a city 
not included in a PMSA or MSA and were not within a PMSA or MSA area were 
considered rural (Hardy & Katsinas, 2006). 
Travel was required to complete this research. To maximize my limited resources, 
the colleges investigated spanned across Texas from Dallas in the north, to San Antonio 
in the west, to Beaumont in the east, and Galveston in the south. The number of colleges 
studied by category were five urban, four suburban and four rural. 
Linking the data to propositions  
The main proposition of this research was that community colleges in Texas had 
policies and procedures in place to identify guest users on their network; however, these 
policies and procedures may not be followed by employees. Either the procedures may be 
too complex for the employees to understand, whether there was training offered to the 
employees regarding the procedures, or whether there were consequences for not 
following the procedures. An alternative proposition is that colleges did not have policies 
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and procedures in 
Instrumentation 
The method for collecting data for this study came from interviews, archived data, 
and direct observations. The first phase of the research started with contacting the 13 
CIOs of the colleges to understand the college’s policies and procedures for allowing 
guests onto the college’s network. I ask the 13 CIOs if he or she would be willing to 
participate in this research. CIOs who did not wish to participate were not contacted in 
the future. Each CIO who wished to participate received a packet containing an 
introductory letter explaining the study, a consent form, and a list of five questions for 
response. The follow is a list of the interview questions: 
1. The State of Texas has a mandate that all community colleges in the state provide 
open access to its computer resources to guest users who are not associated with 
the college. These guests are non-students, non-employees, non-vendors, and non-
suppliers.  
What are the college’s policies for guest usage? 
2. With the college’s policies for guest usage in mind, let’s look at how these 
policies are put into practice.  
How are the policies put into practice by workers at the college?  
How are guests identified before they use the college’s computer? 
What are the current practices of the college to collect identity data of the guest 
users?   
Are these policies in electronic or hard copy for guests to review? 
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3. Policies and procedures are only effective if they are put into practice. 
What training is given to employees who are responsible for collecting 
information on guest users?  How is that training delivered? 
What are the practices used by the college to enforce these policies?   
4. How would I go about using a computer at the college? 
Where is the open computer lab on your campus? 
Is prior notification required?   
Is so, how and whom do I need to notify?  
Does the notification need to be done before visiting the campus or while on 
campus? 
These questions were pretested with two academic IT professionals before the 
interviews were conducted and were modified based on the feedback received. None of 
the feedback was used in this study. The IT professionals asked to review the questions 
were not used in the study’s interview pool.  
The interviews were recorded accept when the interviewee objected. An archive 
data search was conducted after the interviews were completed. This archive data search 
investigated the published policies and procedures records of the colleges such as policy 
manuals, and handbooks. Archive data were then compared with the answers to the 
interview questions for alignment.  
Lastly, I visited each college’s open lab to observe the practices used by the 
colleges in complying with the policies and procedures identified in the interviews. Data 
were collected regarding the methods used by lab workers to collect computer user 
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identification and the methods used to link the user identification to the time of day and 
the computer used. Lab computer usage was then investigated. I analyzed login 
procedures, Internet availability, download capability, and access to network resources 
such as network drives, network printers, the computers console, and access to the 
computer’s IP address. Question four from the interview questionnaire guided me on how 
to gain access to the college’s open computer lab. 
The data collected were then used to compare how top management creates 
policies and procedures and how these policies and procedures were put into practice by 
management, lab employees, and student workers. This comparison was the final step in 
determining the colleges’ compliance with IdM. Compliance was defined by how closely 
the IdM practices aligned with the college’s IdM policies and procedures. 
Additional material and resources needed to complete this research were many 
and varied. Published works such as textbooks, scholarly journals, and web resources 
were utilized for the research sections of this work. The computers, software, and 
facilities of the community colleges’ were also used.  
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
For this research, the community colleges were the main unit of analysis. Sub 
units included managers, employees, policies, procedures, and practices. Managers 
defined in this study were anyone in the paid employment of the college who oversaw IT 
personal or IT functions. Policies were the plans of action that guide the decision making 
process of an organization to achieve an outcome. Procedures were the specific series of 
actions, based on policies, taken in order to obtain a result. Practices were the method 
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used by employees of an organization to implement the organization’s policies and 
procedures. All these were analyzed in this study. 
Data Analysis Plan 
The data analyzed in this section comes solely from the data collected in the 
interviews and college visits. Each interview question was treated as a separate entity in 
order to analyze the data collected more efficiently and systematically. All interview 
results were recorded as percentages of the total responses. Questions not answered were 
counted as a non-response. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number 
using standard rounding methodology. 
Data analysis follows the description of the answers to the interview questions. 
The data analysis also includes any discrepancies in the responses between IT 
professionals working at the same college. For example, an anomaly exists when the CIO 
of a college district stated that all major network implementation decisions of college 
policies are handled at the system level. In contrast, the local IT director stated that the 
implementation decisions of college policy are handled at the college level. The in-depth 
analysis of the interview results appears in Chapter 5 of this study. 
All the colleges in this study were represented either by interviews, college visit, 
or both. Thirteen IT professionals responded to interview requests. These colleges were 
distributed using the Katsinas, Lacey, and Hardy community college classifications as 
follows; five urban, four suburban, and four rural. 
The Katsinas, Lacey, and Hardy classifications used the federal government’s 
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA) and Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
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(MSA) to place community colleges into these three categories. Colleges located in a city 
included in a PMSA or MSA were considered urban. Colleges located in a city but not 
included in a PMSA or MSA, but within the PMSA or MSA area of influence were 
considered suburban. Colleges located in a city not included in a PMSA or MSA and not 
within a PMSA or MSA area of influence were considered rural (Hardy & Katsinas, 
2006). 
The college visits involved locating and gaining access to the open computer labs 
at each college visited. I gained access to one of the college’s computers during each 
visit. The purpose of the college visits was to determine how well the college’s IdM 
policies and procedures were put into practice. The three colleges not represented in the 
interviews were visited. All calculations regarding college visits were based on the full 13 
colleges in the study. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
Credibility was built into this study using triple verifications. This began with 
interviews with top college CIOs regarding policies the college uses for allowing guests 
access to computer resources. These interviews were followed up by interviews with 
college IT managers who create procedures to allow guest access to their college 
computer resources. Lastly, each college in the study was visited to observe the practices 
used by computer lab employees to allow guest access to college computers. The purpose 
of the college visit was to check how well the policies created by IT CIOs and procedures 




Transferability for this study will be difficult because of the transient nature of IT 
professionals and the awareness of the guest access issues. The positions of CIO and IT 
manager will exist at all college in the study as long as there are IT issues at the colleges.  
However, the college IT professionals may not remain the same.  College IT 
professionals may retire, move, be reassigned, or depart for other organizations. The 
campus visits can also be replicated; however, awareness of the guest access issue may 
be more prominent once this study is released.    
Dependability 
Golafshani (2003) struck a comparison between quantitative and qualitative 
research. He stated that the quantitative researcher sees reliability as whether the results 
can be replicable. With regards to validity, this is also dependent on whether the 
researchers actually measure what they intended to measure. With qualitative research the 
question of replicability may not be possible because the researcher was looking at a one-
time phenomenon. Golafshani (2003) cited the studies of Glesne and Peshkin (1992), 
Winter (2000), and Hoepf (1997) on reliability and validity in qualitative research as 
precision, credibility, and transferability.  
I used several methods to ensure reliability and validity in this study. First, there 
was a variety of literature from multiple sources cited in this work. Second, a narrative 
was generated of each for the 13 encounters describing the phenomenon (being a guest on 
the college’s computer network). This narrative followed the guidelines established by 
Yin’s (2009) research for maintaining a chain of evidence of all records and field notes. 
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Third, a college-by-college comparison was conducted after each college visit to 
determine patterns with the visits (Yin, 2009). 
Ethical Procedures 
Merriam (2002) stressed the importance of conducting qualitative research in an 
ethical manner. Merriam believed that willing participants who choose to be part of a 
study are invaluable. Their contribution to a research study may enable the generation of 
new knowledge. It is the ethical responsibility of the researchers to ensure that their 
studies would not jeopardize the participants in any way, shape, or form. For this study, I 
asked for consent and approval from the participants by providing them with a 
description of the goals and methods of the study and I assured them of their anonymity. I 
also gave each interviewee an opportunity to ask any questions they had before they 
decided to participate. Participants were given the option to answer as many or as few of 
the questions as they wish and they could end the interview at any time.  
I also needed to be respectful and sensitive toward the participants. In order to do 
so, I spent time at the beginning of the interview explaining the goals of the study, as well 
as that the information collected will remain confidential, and how the data would be 
used and safeguarded. A pseudonym was created to protect the privacy of each 
participant. All participants received a copy of this research as a token of appreciation. 
Summary 
The methodology that was used during the course of this research was discussed 
in this chapter. The chapter started with a discussion of the case study methodology and 
the use of a multi-case study. Next, the instrument of measurement for this research (the 
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IAM) model was described. Third, IT departments at community colleges were identified 
as the primary audience for this research. Fourth, the primary methodology and 
procedures for collecting field data were discussed followed by a discussion on how the 
data from the field research would be presented along with the outcomes of the research. 
Lastly, the issues of reliability and validity for this research were discussed along with 





Chapter 4: Results  
Identifying guest users on an open community college computer system is an 
intricate and complex social construct. Texas state law requires community colleges to 
give guests access to computer resources.  This regulation comes from the Texas 
department of information resources rule 1 TAC 201.13, information security standards. 
This state law also requires guest users to be identified before using computer resources. 
The main difficulty in analyzing and defining this social construct is the experiences of 
those studied may be very different.  
The experience may occur in different locations, with different people, or with 
different levels of knowledge. The experience may be different even in the same 
environment depending on the time of occurrence or the device used. Qualitative data 
were gathered regarding the identity collection of guest users and the management 
methods used to collect pertinent information. The data were collected via interviews, 
campus observations, and policy searches. The focus of the analysis and interpretation of 
the data collected was not only on how identity information was obtained, but also on 
how closely the practice of collecting identity information matched the policies and 
procedures set by the IT professionals. 
Gathering the qualitative data was time-consuming, but not difficult. As in many 
qualitative studies, the difficulty was in finding meaningful categories and relationships 
within the data collected. The primary focus of my research problem was to determine 
how closely the identity management policies, procedures, and practices align at each 
college. With that the findings are compiled into three logical categories: interviews with 
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college CIOs, interviews with other college managers knowledgeable regarding IT, and 
visits to the college campuses. 
The qualitative data collection was oriented in three areas. First was with the IdM 
policies, procedures, and practices of the college. Second was in determining how well 
these policies, procedures, and practices aligned. Third was in determining how well 
these IdM approaches protected the college from liability from inappropriate or illegal 
acts. Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2013) stated that qualitative research should come 
from two distinct approaches, paradigmatic and syntagmatic. In the paradigmatic 
approach, the data is variable-oriented, and in the syntagmatic approach, the data is 
process oriented. 
Since IdM at community colleges is hierarchical in nature, there is a natural and 
direct interaction between policymakers and the implementation of those policies. 
Qualitative patterns should exist in these relationships. In this study, these relationships 
were analyzed to determine how members at each level view their roles in the process 
and how each level is synchronized within the overall IdM process. 
Research Setting 
Originally, 24 IT professionals were identified as potential interviewees for this 
study. Two CIOs and one IT manager accepted the invitation. One IT manager declined 
the invitation. Additional e-mails and telephone calls were needed to convince the rest of 
the potential interviewees to participate in this study. 
The follow-up e-mails and phone calls revealed an additional CIO and four IT 
managers from the original list willing to participate in the study. The interviews began at 
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this time. An additional 10 IT professionals were identified during the initial interviews 
as possible additional participants. E-mails were sent to the additional IT managers 
between December 17, 2013 and January 6, 2014. In total, 34 IT professionals were 
identified as potential participants. Eleven of the potential participants declined 
participation in the study and 10 did not reply to e-mail and phone invitations. The final 
sample population for the interviews was 13 (38%) IT professionals.  
The 13 participants held the following positions: 
CIO – 3 
IT Director – 5 
IT Manager – 1 
Vice Chancellor, Network Services – 1 
Dean – 1 
Network Engineer – 2 
The initial position classifications for the interviews were college CIOs and IT 
managers. Several of the above positions did not fit neatly into the initial classifications 
for this study. Definitions for title classification had to be expanded in order to fit all the 
actual job titles into the existing categories of this study. For the purposes of this study, 
all those interviewees who were the head of the IT department for the college were 
classified as CIOs. Anyone interviewed who reported to someone else in the IT 
department and made procedural decisions for the college’s open computer lab were 
classified as IT managers. The two network engineers were categorized as IT managers. 
Both network engineers were in charge of the IT department of their colleges’ satellite 
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campuses and answered to a campus or district IT CIO. There was an anomaly with the 
title of IT Director.  
At three of the colleges, the IT directors were classified as IT managers, and at 
two of the colleges, they were classified as CIOs. The IT directors at three of the 
suburban colleges reported to district CIOs. The IT directors at two of the rural colleges 
were the head of the colleges’ IT departments. There was seven interviewees classified as 
CIO and six interviewees classified as IT managers. Regardless of how the different 
colleges classified their positions, all these IT professionals had managerial 
responsibilities. The college interviews resulted with eight colleges with one IT 
professional interviewed, one college with three IT professionals interviewed, one 
colleges with two IT professionals interviewed, and three colleges with no IT 
professionals interviewed. 
Demographics 
For this research, the community colleges were the main unit of analysis. Sub 
units included CIOs, managers, employees, policies, procedures, and practices. CIOs 
were defined as a person who has overall responsibility for the college’s information 
system. Managers defined in this study were anyone in the paid employment of the 
college who oversaw IT personal or IT functions of a college campus or satellite campus 
and answered to the college’s CIO. Employees were defined as those Policies were the 
plans of action that guide the decision making process of an organization to achieve an 
outcome. Procedures were the specific series of actions, based on policies, taken in order 
to obtain a result. Practices were the method used by employees of an organization to 
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implement the organization’s policies and procedures. All these were analyzed in this 
study. 
Data Collection 
All the individuals interviewed in this study were IT professional managers at 
community colleges in Texas. All the IT professionals held managerial positions in the 
college’s IT departments and have knowledge of the security policies used for guest 
access. I e-mailed an invitation to the 24 original participants identified as IT CIO and IT 
managers at each 2-year college in the study between October 1, 2013 and October 3, 
2013. These individuals were identified via their colleges’ websites.  
During the next few weeks, additional participants were suggested by the original 
participants. The new participants were identified and contacted in the same manner as 
the original participants. Consequently, I e-mailed additional invitations to those who met 
the study’s criteria between December 17, 2013 and January 6, 2014. Several e-mails 
were sent to all identified potential participants during the dates listed. A copy of the 
consent form and a copy of the interview questions were attached to all e-mails. 
A total of 34 community college IT professionals were identified and invited to 
participate in this study. Of the 34 IT professionals invited, 13 (38%) agreed to be 
interviewed for this study. These 13 IT professionals represented 10 colleges in the study.  
Three colleges were not represented in the interview process.  The college interviews 
resulted with eight colleges with one IT professional interviewed, one college with three 
IT professionals interviewed, one colleges with two IT professionals interviewed, and 
three colleges with no IT professionals interviewed. These IT professionals either denied 
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my request to be interviewed or never replied to the invitations to be interviewed.  Even 
though the IT professionals from these colleges were not interviewed, the colleges were 
visited to observe IdM practices in the open computer labs. The college IT professionals 
represented the first part of the study. The second half of the study required visits to the 
computer labs of the college in the study.  
I identified 13 community colleges in Texas to visit. The colleges selected were 
divided between the three Katsinas, Lacey, and Hardy classification. This system has 
been used to identify community college by the federal and state governments for more 
than a decade. The primary purpose of this traditional classification was to create an 
empirically supported, valid tool for researchers to use when studying 2-year colleges 
(Hardy, 2006). Five colleges were classified as urban, four were classified as suburban, 
and four were classified rural. All 13 colleges were visited during the fall of 2013. The 
purpose of the college visit was to check how well the policies created by IT CIOs and 
procedures developed by IT managers were put into practice. Nine of the colleges had 
multiple independent campuses and multiple satellite campuses. Two of the colleges had 
one campus and a satellite campus. One college had only one main campus. 
Data Collection from College Visits 
The purpose of the college visit was to check how well the policies created by IT 
CIOs and procedures developed by IT managers were put into practice. All 13 colleges 
were visited during the fall of 2013. Most of the answers to the interview questions 
between a college’s CIO and IT manager agreed; however, there was one noted 
exception. The CIO of one college system stated all network security policies originated 
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at the system level. One of the IT managers in that system stated the network security 
policies were all local decisions, with each campus having different policies, procedures, 
and practices.  
The IT professionals at three colleges did not participate in the interview portion 
of this study; however, the college’s open computer labs were visited to determine IdM 
practices used. Determining how closely the IdM policies, procedures, and practices 
aligned could not be determined; however, the actual IdM practices used at the colleges 
could be observed. The following data were collected at the college visits. 
Sign-in required. Of the 13 campuses visited only five required some sign-in to 
access one of the college’s computers. Eight of the campuses did not require any sign-in. 
ID checked. Only three (23%) of the 13 campuses visited required guest users to 
provide some identification. Ten (77%) of the campuses did not require any proof of 
identification. Of the three campuses, two campuses tied the state-issued ID to actual 
login credentials. The staff at these two colleges held the ID for the duration of the 
guest’s stay. Both of the campuses linked the ID to the user ID and password issued to 
the guest. One college required a library card to access a computer instead of a state-
issued ID. Applications for a library card were available at the college’s library if a guest 
did not have a library card. A state-issued ID was required to apply for a library card. 
User ID and Password issued. This mirrored the ID check section. Only three of 
the colleges required a guest to acquire a user ID and password. Two of the college 
linked the user ID and password directly to the guest’s driver’s license. Both colleges 
recorded the driver’s license information and kept the card while the guest used the 
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computer. One (7%) college used a county library card as identification. The username 
and password were the name and number on the library card. Eleven (79%) of the 
campuses visited had generic credentials and did not require the quest to provide 
identification. These generic credentials were already entered into the computers. All the 
guest had to do was sit down at the computer to use the college’s resources. An employee 
at one of these colleges knew guests were allowed, but did not know the procedures to 
log the guest into the library computer. Eventually she provided her own credentials to 
allow the guest access to the college’s computer.  
Staff available at the college. Staff availability at the college library or open 
computer lab were minimal, usually one or two employees on duty at the time the guest 
arrived. Five (35%) of the campuses had one employee and five (35%) had two 
employees. Three (21%) of the colleges had three employees and one (7%) had no 
employee at all on duty. It is interesting to note that the two colleges with the most 
employees on duty were the colleges with the strictest, most labor intensive identification 
policies. 
IP address acquired. The computer’s IP address is the key to identifying a 
device connected to the Internet (Rock, 2007). With a computer’s IP address, any 
beginning hacker can take control of the computer, make it a zombie, or clone the 
computer. Cloning a computer makes the computer appear as a legitimate computer in 
order to circumvent network security systems. Of the 13 colleges visited, nine (69%) 
allowed access to the computer’s IP address. Four (31%) of the colleges locked down 
their computers, so IP addresses were not accessible by a computer user. 
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Computer in an open lab or library. All the colleges visited had both a library 
and at least one open computer lab. I went to the college’s information booth and asked 
where to go for computer access. The employees at seven (50%) of colleges directed me 
to an open computer lab. Employees at five (35%) of the colleges directed me to the 
college’s library. The information receptionist at one (8%) of college did not know where 
to direct me. The computer labs at both of these colleges were designated for students 
only and required a student ID to enter the computer lab. Guest access to the colleges’ 
computer were in the campus libraries. It is interesting to note that one of the colleges 
where a guest must use a library computer did not have a practice in place to identify or 
login a guest user. The librarian on duty used her user ID and password to allow me to 
use a computer. 
Computers restricted for guest usage. At three (23%) of the 13 colleges 
computers were allocated for only guest usage. One of the colleges offered guest users a 
bank of two computers available on a first come, first served basis. The computers were 
kept in a separate part of the library. These two computers were far from the top of the 
line. The reserved computers at the other two colleges were not segregated. These 
computers were part of the college computer lab and could be used by a student if guests 
were not using the computers. The identity practices at two of these three colleges were 
the strictest. The policies at both of these colleges require guests to present a state-issued 
ID, the ID was held during the time the guest was on the computer and the guest 
information from the ID was recorded on a log by the attendant. The attendant then 
issued a temporary user ID and password to the guest. The guest was then escorted to a 
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computer. The guest’s ID was returned after the guest logged off of the computer. Once 
the guest ID was returned, the user ID and password were deactivated. 
Download available. All but one of the computers tested allowed downloads. 
The researcher accessed the Internet and downloaded an image from a trusted cite and the 
Power Point viewer from the Microsoft cite. Nine of the 13 computers allowed 
installation of the Power Point viewer. The same nine computers also allowed the 
downloaded image to be placed on the desktop as a background image. Both of these 
types of downloads are potential security concerns. The ability to change system settings 
and installing applications outside of the local configuration are methods hackers can use 
to disrupt normal computer usage, glean information from other users, or gain access to 
other computers. 
Access to a printer. Access to a printer was available at all 13 campuses. Three 
of the campuses requested payment for printer services; however, only one kept the 
printer behind a desk. The librarian on duty collected payment of ten cents per page. 
Printing fees were collected at the other two colleges only when the employee on duty 
was near the printer. 
Access to network drives. Access to network directories was not allowed at any 
of the campuses. Other than access to a network printer, access to other network 
resources was not available. 
Ability to change computer configuration. All but one of the computers tested 
allowed for some type of configuration change. On all computers, I attempted to open the 
control panel to change the background settings of the computer. Nine of the 13 allowed 
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full access to the control panel. On these computers, I was able to place a picture 
downloaded from the Internet as the desktop image. Four of the 13 computers restricted 
access to the control panel. The ability to change system configuration from the control 
panel and install downloaded files are methods hackers use to disrupt normal computer 
usage, glean information from other users, or gain access to other computers. All these 
were potential security concerns. 
Ability to access the command prompts. I was able to access the command 
prompt from nine of the 13 computers tested. The command prompt provides direct 
access to the computer’s operating system, system controls, and the root directory. 
Access such as this can give hackers control of the computer and access to all system 
resources. 
Data Analysis 
Thirteen individuals representing ten of the 13 colleges agreed to be interviewed. 
The IT professionals at three of the colleges either declined to be interviewed or did not 
reply to any of the invitations to participate in the study.  E-mail invitations were sent to 
all 34 potential participants of the study detailing the topic of the study and asking them 
to participate in the study. Attached to each e-mail were the IRB and interview questions. 
By the end of invitation period, 13 of the 34 identified potential participants agreed to be 
interviewed, seven classified as CIOs and six classified as IT managers. In total, there 
was a 38% participation rate. 
Interview Question Analysis 
Interview Question 1: What are the college’s policies for guest usage?   
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All 13 participants said their college had policies regarding guest access to their 
network computers. Eleven of the participants indicated that their colleges had guidelines 
available on the college’s website. The other two used the policies of the county library 
system, also found on the college’s websites. Although the guest usage policies were 
found on all the colleges’ websites, I would not have been able to find the policies 
without the exact document titles. Since these policies are important to potential guest 
users, as well as college management, they should be easily accessed from the college 
websites. 
Much of the difficulties in finding the colleges’ written policies revolved around 
terminology. Prior to the interviews and college visits, I looked for guest usage policies 
on the colleges’ websites. Using the search term guest users on the college’s websites did 
not return any findings. The interviewees did not use the term guest users. Ten (77%) of 
the interviewees used the term public access instead of guest access. The remaining three 
(23%) of interviewees used the term open access instead of guest access. The colleges’ 
policies found on the Internet mirrored the different terminology. All three of these terms, 
guest users, public access, and open access have the same meaning, making the search 
more difficult without knowing the label that reflected the intended meaning. 
The responses from the interviewees ranged across a broad spectrum of security 
levels. The most common policy nomenclature that was mentioned regarding guest user 
access is summarized below: 
1. Open access to the college’s computer system requiring no user ID or 
password to be issued to guest users 
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2. Sign-in sheets at the entrance of the computer lab with no user ID and 
password to be issued to guest users 
3. Sign-in sheets at the entrance of the computer lab and a user ID and password 
to be issued to guest users 
4. Sign-in sheets at the entrance of the computer lab, requiring a State-issued ID 
to be presented, and a user ID and password to be issued to guest users 
5. Sign-in sheets at the entrance of the computer lab, no user ID and password to 
be issued to guest users, guests assigned a particular computer 
6. Library cards required to use the college’s computers 
Interview Question 2: With the college’s policies for guest usage in mind, 
let’s look at how these policies are put into practice. 
How are the policies put into practice by workers at the college? 
Four (31%) of the 13 actual participants stated that all computer policies came 
from the IT department to the employees of the computer labs. Two (15%) stated the 
policies came from the college’s board of directors/trustees to the IT department and then 
relayed to the employees of the computer labs. Seven (54%) stated the IT department 
made recommendations to the board of directors/trustees. The IT department informed 
the employees of the computer labs once the board approved the policies. 
Although the classification methodology used in this study relied on the Katsinas, 
Lacey, and Hardy (2006) community colleges classification system, it is important to 
note how each of the three categories, rural, suburban, and urban, were represented. 
There were 13 colleges in total for this study; four rural, four suburban, and five urban 
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colleges. A total of four colleges fell into the rural classification. Two of these colleges 
had only one campus and no satellite campuses. One of the rural colleges had one main 
college and a satellite campus and one college had two main colleges and a satellite 
campus. All four of the suburban colleges had at least one main college with multiple 
satellite campuses. All five of the urban colleges had multiple independent campuses 
with satellite campuses. Three of the suburban colleges exercised district control over 
campus computer access and two colleges exercised local control. Two of the urban 
colleges exercised district control over campus computer access and two exercised local 
control over campus computer access. All four rural colleges exercised local control over 
campus computer access. 
How are guests identified before they use the college’s computer? 
All the interviewees stated that guest users did not need prior notification to use 
the college’s labs or library computers. All the interviewees stated that their campuses 
were open to the public for a range of purposes including the use of their computer labs 
and libraries. It is interesting to note that nine of the interviewees stated there were no 
guest identification requirements to use the college’s computers; however, at five of the 
colleges guests were required to show identification at the open computer lab before 
using a college computer. Practices used computer lab employees did not match the 
procedures setup by college IT managers. 
What are the current practices of the college to collect identity data of the guest 
users? 
Five (38%) of the interviewees stated their college had policies in place to require 
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guests to show a government issued identification before using a college computer. The 
remaining eight (62%) stated the policies at their colleges did not require proof of 
identification. Five (38%) required guests to fill out a sign-in log. Only two interviewees 
stated their college’s policy required guests to show a Texas driver’s license or Texas 
issued ID before granting access to a computer and kept the ID while the guest used the 
computer. Another interviewee stated that the policy at their college required guests to 
show a county issued library card. The college’s board of trustees partnered with the local 
county library system to provide library services to the college and community at large. 
The college library was built, equipped, and supplied by the college as part of the 
college’s initial footprint. The library was staffed, maintained, and resupplied by the 
county library system. 
Are these policies in electronic or hard copy for guests to review? 
All the interviewees stated the college policies for allowing guests were available 
in electronic format on the college’s website. This also included the colleges using the 
county library system to manage computer resources. 
All 13 participants said their college had policies regarding guest access to their 
network computers. Eleven (85%) of the participants indicated that their colleges had 
guidelines available on the college’s website. The other two used the policies of the 
county library system. Although I was able to find the guest usage policies on all the 
colleges’ websites, they were very difficult to find in several cases. I would not have been 
able to find the policies without the exact document titles. If I had such difficulty, 
perhaps guest users have similar difficulty. 
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Interview Question 3: Policies and procedures are only effective if they are put into 
practice. 
What training was given to employees who are responsible for collecting 
information on guest users? How was that training delivered? 
Training was important to most of the interviewees. Eleven (85%) of the 
interviewees stated that the computer lab employees received some training regarding 
allowing access to the college’s computers. The divergence came in knowing which 
department was responsible for the training and the depth of the training. The IT 
department was responsible for the training at only one (8%) of the colleges. The 
college’s open computer lab management was responsible at two (15%) colleges. At 
eight (62%) of the colleges, the library staff was responsible for the training. Two (15%) 
of the interviewees could not identify the department responsible for the training. 
What are the practices used by the college to enforce these policies? 
The departments responsible for enforcing the security policies mirrored the 
departments responsible for training. Eleven (85%) of the interviewees stated 
enforcement of the security policies of the college was an important issue. The IT 
department was responsible for enforcing the security policies in only one (8%) of the 
colleges. The open computer lab management was responsible in two (15%) colleges. At 
eight (62%) of the colleges the library staff was responsible for enforcing the security 
policies. Two (15%) of the interviewees could not identify the department responsible for 
enforcing security methods. 
Interview Question 4: How would I go about using a computer at the college? 
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Nine (69%) of the interviewees knew how a guest would be guided to a computer 
lab. Four (31%) stated that all employees on campus knew how to conduct the guest to 
the proper location. Three (23%) stated librarians or library workers were the only ones 
who knew how to guide guests to a computer. As long as a guest found the library, they 
could find help. Two (15%) of the interviewees stated that only open computer lab 
employees or IT employees would be able to guide the guest to the open computer lab or 
library. Four (31%) of the interviewees did not know how a guest would find the 
computer lab or library on their campus. 
Where is the open computer lab on your campus? 
All the interviewees knew the location of the open computer labs on their campus. 
Eight (62%) of the interviewees stated that all guests would be directed to the campus 
library. Two (15%) of the interviewees stated guests would be directed to an open 
computer lab on campus. Three (23%) identified some place other than an open lab or 
library. These other locations for computer usage by guests included specially designated 
areas on campus, specific computers in the library, or a particular open computer lab. 
Was prior notification required? 
According to all the interviewees, prior notification was not required to use any of 
the colleges’ computers. All the interviewees stated their campuses were open to the 
public for all purposes including the use of computer labs and libraries. Five (38%) 
colleges require guests to identify themselves at the open computer lab before using a 
campus computer. Eight (62%) of the interviewees stated there was no guest 
identification requirement to use the college’s computers. 
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If so, how and who do I need to notify? 
All the interviewees stated there was no prior notification required to use any of 
the colleges’ computers. 
Does the notification need to be done before visiting the campus or while on 
campus? 
Again, all the interviewees stated there was no prior notification required to use 
any of the colleges’ computers. 
Interview Question 5: How would you describe the ideal IdM system for collecting 
guest ID information to provide guest's access to your college’s computers? 
The ideal Identity management (IdM) system described by all the interviewees 
fell into four categories: biometrics, partnerships, showing ID, or not concerned. Two 
(15%) of the interviewees stated they would like to have biometrics introduced across 
their campuses. Both interviewees liked the fingerprint scan and thought that the 
biometric methods was the simplest and most secure method of obtaining guest 
identification. Six (46%) of the interviewees looked for partnerships with trusted third 
parties such as the Texas Department of Public Safety, the county/local library systems, 
or third party federated alliances. Three (23%) of the interviewees were satisfied with 
obtaining state-issued identification cards. Two (15%) of the respondents were not 
concerned with improving their IdM system. 
All the interviewees had other IdM concerns outside of those associated with 
guest access to college computer access. Five (38%) of the interviewees were more 
concerned with a relatively new phenomenon on college campuses, the notion of bringing 
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your own device (BYOD) to the campus. Individuals who bring their own electronic 
devices to campus expect the devices to work seamlessly with the college’s network. 
However, because the college did not issue these devices, the devices may not have 
software or hardware compliant with the college’s Wi-Fi system. Examples of these 
devices were personal laptops, tablet PCs, iPads, smart phones, and e-text readers such as 
Amazon’s Kindle Fire, Barnes and Noble’s Nook, and Sony’s eReader. Due to the unique 
configuration of these devices, BYOD also requires multiple Wi-Fi connections. For 
example, one person could be using a college computer to complete a term paper while 
listening to iHeart radio on their smartphone, checking a Facebook post on a tablet 
computer, and referencing an e-text on their eReader. That one person used four Internet 
connections. Multiple devices used by one person add additional stress to the campus Wi-
Fi network which was another cause of concern among the interviewees. The issue of 
BYOD to campus is an important issue; however, it is outside the scope of this study. 
Consequences, costs, and value to colleges of BYOD would be a good topic for future 
studies. 
The remaining eight (62%) of the interviewees identified IdM on the campus Wi-
Fi system as a primary security concern. Common to all eight of these interviewees was a 
concern with access to the college’s network through guest Wi-Fi access. Students, 
faculty, staff, and administrators have user IDs and passwords to access the college’s Wi-
Fi Internet access. All other users simply use the guest access. The guest access does not 
require a user ID or password. Anyone with a wireless network card on a computing 
device can gain access to the Internet at the college. Eight IT professionals saw this type 
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of guest access as the primary IdM concern for their departments. 
College Visit Analysis 
 Community colleges are not all equal. The Katsinas et al. (2006) study classified 
community colleges using data from the National Center for Education Statistics' 
Integrated Postsecondary Educational Data System (IPEDS) and Higher Education 
General Information Surveys (HEGIS) into three categories: urban, suburban, and rural. 
This classification method puts community colleges into like categories for funding, size, 
and population. For example, local funding capabilities and population needs of an urban 
community college differ from those of a suburban community college, and both are 
different from a rural community college. 
The 13 colleges chosen for this study were separated into the Katsinas, Lacey, and 
Hardy classification. All of the colleges visited were located across the southeast, central, 
and northeast sections of Texas. These categories were developed in order to provide 
researchers, policymakers, and government officials the ability to understand service 
areas associated with each community college. The needs and resources of students in an 
urban environment are different from those of a suburban student, and much different 
from a rural student. These three categories also identify the tax base available to the 
community colleges. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
The intent of this study was to interview top college CIOs regarding how policies 
for allowing guests access to computer resources. These interviews were followed up by 
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interviews with college IT managers who create procedures to allow guest access to their 
college computer resources. Lastly, each college in the study was visited to observe the 
practices used by computer lab employees to allow guest access to college computers. 
The purpose of the CIO interviews, IT manager interviews, and the college visit was to 
check how closely the policies created by IT CIOs and procedures developed by IT 
managers were put into practice.  
Transferability 
Although this study can be replicated, the outcome may be very different for 
future researchers. Transferability for this study will be difficult because of the transient 
nature of IT professionals and the awareness of the guest access issues. Two college 
CIOs and five IT managers were replaced during the three months between identification 
and interviews. By the time this study is published all of the IT professionals interviewed 
my not be in the same positions as they are now. No advanced notification was given to 
college IT professionals regarding college visits. Awareness of the guest access issue will 
be more prominent once this study is released.    
Dependability 
Dependability relies on whether a researcher actually measured what was 
intended to be measure. With qualitative research, the question of replicability may not 
be possible because the researcher was looking at a one-time phenomenon. Additionally, 
Golafshani cited the studies of Glesne and Peshkin (1992), Winter (2000), and Hoepf 




I used several methods to ensure reliability and validity in this study. First, there 
was a variety of literature from multiple sources cited in this work. Second, a narrative 
was generated of each for the 13 encounters describing the phenomenon (being a guest on 
the college’s computer network). This narrative followed the guidelines established by 
Yin’s (2009) research for maintaining a chain of evidence of all records and field notes. 
Third, a college-by-college comparison was conducted after each college visit to 
determine patterns with the visits (Yin, 2009). 
Study Results 
This study found a link between the policies, procedures, and practices for guest 
access at community colleges in the study. However, the link was only valid where the 
policies, procedures, and practices followed strong IdM guidelines. Only three of the 
colleges in the study had strong IdM guidelines for identifying guest users at their 
colleges. The policies set by college CIOs matched procedures set by college IT 
managers. Computer lab employees use strong IdM practice at colleges with strong IdM 
policies and procedures.  At these colleges the computer lab employees collect guest 
identification, issue unique user IDs and passwords, return the guest’s ID after the guest 
has completed the computer usage, and deactivate the user ID and password.  Colleges 
that have week IdM policies and procedures also have poor IdM practice.  The lab 
employees at these colleges either have generic logins assigned to a computer or use 
personal user IDs and passwords to allow a guest access to computer resources. 
  There was two common denominator for all of the study.  First, was the locus of 
control at the college.  The IT professionals at colleges with strong central administration 
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used strong IdM practices.  Colleges with weak central administration did not.  This was 
most apparent in of the interviews with two college districts CIOs.  Both colleges have 
similar make up.  Both are suburban college districts with multiple independent 
campuses.  One of the colleges had a strong centralized administration located at the 
college’s district office.  The campuses, although independent, relied on the district IT 
office for funding, equipment, policies, and other resources.  The other college district 
had a weak central administration.  Funding, equipment, policies and other resources 
were allocated directly to the independent campus, thus by-passing the central 
administration. 
The second driving factor was funding.  Small rural colleges with small budgets 
also had very weak IdM practices.  These colleges simply did not have the funding 
resources to purchase the additional software needed to track guests or did not have the 
funding to hire and train employees on proper IdM practices.  Nearly all of the rural 
colleges had only one lab assistant on duty at the time of my visit.  The lab assistant also 
doubled as a tutor for students needing help with class assignments and homework.   
Summary 
This chapter contained the results of the field research of this study. The Katsinas, 
Lacey, and Hardy classification for evaluating community colleges was explained. This 
classification system categorized community colleges by their service area: urban, 
suburban, and rural. Next, the interviews with community colleges’ CIOs, and IT 
managers were summarized. Initially, 24 individuals were identified for interview in this 
study. During the initial set of interviews another 10 individuals were identified as 
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potential interviewees. Totally, 34 IT professionals were identified for interview. 
However, only 13 IT professionals from 10 colleges agreed to be interviewed. 
Initial contact was made with the potential interviews via e-mail. This e-mail 
included the Walden consent form, details of the study, and the interview questions. 
Those interested in participating in the study were asked to reply to the e-mail with I 
Accept in the body. Thirty-six percent of the identified potential interviewees accepted to 
participate. The interviewees were chosen for their specific knowledge and understanding 
of the college’s development and implementation of security policies, procedures, and 
practices. Their response to the interview questions appear in the first half of the chapter. 
The next section of the chapter contained the field data from the college visits. I 
was able to locate the open computer lab and use a computer on all the campuses. I 
followed all the rules for campus computer usage. Three colleges required users to sign-
in before accessing the computer lab. All sign-in sheets were filled out and identifications 
were shown at all campuses when requested. All instructions from college employees 
were followed. Some form of ID was required at only three of the computer labs. A 
driver’s license was required at two of the labs. The driver’s license was kept until my 
computer session was complete. A temporary user ID and password were generated by 
computer lab employees. At one college a county library card was required at one of the 
open labs. The remaining 10 college open labs required no identification to access 
computer resources. At one campus the librarian used her own user ID and password to 
log into the computer I used. This lack of computer security by the majority of colleges 
demonstrates community colleges in Texas need further security awareness and 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
One of the greatest challenges at all educational institution, including community 
colleges is network security. Community colleges are looking for ways to increase the 
protection of its networks and information systems from internal and external threats such 
as hacking, identity theft, viruses, and data loss and corruption. All of these security 
concerns can be mitigated by identifying all users of college computer resources. 
Identifying guest user is the focus of this study. Institutions of higher education are at a 
greater risk for these outside threats because of the open nature of the institution. Many 
IT departments are stretched to the limits to meet the equipment and staffing needs of an 
ever increasing and changing student body. Finding cost effective, labor friendly methods 
to identify guest users can alleviate budget and labor concerns as well as help protect 
colleges from liability caused by hackers, disgruntled employees, and dissatisfied 
students (D'Amico, Katsinas, & Friedel, 2012). 
IT professionals interviewed in this study at community colleges in Texas believe 
all aspects of computer security are important. Alerts and warnings are issued from IT 
departments every time a new virus, such as Heartbleed, or a new spam social 
engineering technique appear. This study reflected the views and beliefs of 13 IT 
professionals at 10 Texas community colleges regarding network security policy, 
procedures, and practices. 
Chapter 3 contained the research methodology and conceptual framework of 
policy, procedure, and practice of this study. The design of the interview questions asked 
of the IT professionals in this study remained the same. It was expected that fewer IT 
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professionals would participate in the study than initially planned. Even after data were 
collected from interviews and from college visits, the design remained primarily the 
same. The definition for college CIO and IT manager needed to be redefined and one new 
category was added to the design plan. The definition of CIO and IT manager needed to 
be expanded because the position titles used at the different colleges varied widely. I 
added a new category of outsourcing the college’s network security authentication based 
on the information gathered during the college visits and interviews. The colleges added 
to the new category outsourced their library’s computer management. This outsourcing 
included identification and authentication of open lab computer users to the college’s 
library system. Figure 7 shows the complete conceptual design for this study.  
 
Figure 8. Conceptual Design of Network Security Policy, Procedures, and Practice. 
(Permission to reproduce image) 
It is noteworthy that all interviewed were keenly aware of security issues facing 
their respective colleges and saw the importance of identity management on their 
campuses. The interviewees also saw the importance of IdM in other areas of network 
security. The data collected indicated that the college CIOs and IT managers have two 
great concerns beyond identity management of guest users. The first area of concern was 
identity management of the college’s wireless infrastructure. The second area of concern 
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was budget constraints. These findings also match research found at other universities 
(Educause, n.d.). The data collected provided an interesting insight into the security 
policies, procedures, and practices at these community colleges in Texas. For the most 
part, these community colleges in Texas appear to have a good balance of security and 
academic freedom of research for faculty, students, and employees; however, this breaks 
down when it comes to guest access.  
Interpretation of Findings 
Texas law states that all computer users must have a unique identifier before 
access to computer resources can be accessed (Texas Administrative Code, 2014). This 
can be avoided if a risk assessment shows no risk. None of the interview participants 
mentioned completing a risk analysis on computer users. Nine of the 13 colleges visited 
had generic computer logins assigned to open lab computers. These generic logins only 
identified the computer being used, not the person using the computer.  
There was a contradiction between IT professionals at two different colleges. 
Both colleges were suburban college systems with multiple campuses. The CIO of one 
college stated the campuses were all autonomous with little to no intervention by the 
district office regarding IdM procedures for any user classification. An IT manager at one 
campus stated the exact opposite. He said the CIO in the system’s IT department handled 
all identity management decisions. At another college, the CIO stated all the identity 
management decisions are made at the system level. One of the campus IT managers 
stated the opposite. He stated each campus was responsible for creating and 
implementing all IdM policies, policies, and procedures. When visiting the campuses, I 
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found the first anomaly was resolved in favor of the college system’s CIO. 
Only three colleges, 31%, had robust IdM policies, policies, and procedures in 
place to identify guest users. Two of the colleges used time consuming methods of 
gathering a state-issued ID from the user, logging the information, developing a guest 
account, and issuing the guest user ID and password. The other college outsourced the 
identification to the local county library system. This system was far less labor intensive; 
however, it relies on secondary identification without a photo identification for 
verification. All three of these colleges were considered suburban college systems with 
multiple campuses. This low percentage of identification verification among the sample 
indicates that the rest of the colleges may also be at risk for misuse of the college’s 
computer assets by guest users. 
I began this study with the assumption that community colleges in Texas have 
IdM policies, policies, and procedures in place to identify guest users on the college’s 
network. Only three (23%) of the 13 colleges studied had strict policies and procedures in 
place for identifying guest users. Seven (54%) of the colleges studied did not require 
guest to identify themselves when using college computers or had only an unverified sign 
in sheet. This apparent lack of alignment between policies, policies, and procedures was 
confirmed after interviewing the IT CIOs and managers at the colleges and visiting the 
colleges’ computer labs. Three (23%) of the colleges studied had nonverified sign-in 
sheets. These sheets only listed names, dates, and times of visits. There were no 
correlations between the sign-in sheet, who signed in, and which computer was used. 
There were also no corroboration of identification of those signing in on the sheets and 
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the signer’s actual identification. 
Ten (77%) of those interviewed did not see guest login as an issue at the forefront 
of IT security needs. Initial responses by most of the interviewees revolved around the 
college’s policies used to allow guest users on the college’s wireless network. This lack 
of concern by the IT professionals was unexpected. 
Limitations of the Study 
Computer and network security is a broad and expanding topic. This study was 
limited to the security issues facing community colleges in the State of Texas because of 
their open access requirement. Much will be written regarding court cases, laws, and 
standards regarding security. Several sections will expand into general areas of computer 
security such as firewalls, proxy servers, traffic monitoring, encryption, privacy, 
copyright protection, and data theft. These sections are intended to make the reader more 
familiar with the complex and growing area of computer security and the issues facing 
computer professionals. Although these sections will appear in this study, they will be 
limited to only basic information or directly linked to IdM issues facing community 
colleges in Texas. 
Recommendations 
Texas law is clear when it comes to securing computer resources at colleges. A 
user must have a unique user ID and password to access any computer resource (Texas 
Administrative Code, 2014). Two (15%) used a time consuming ID collection process. 
One (8%) outsourced guest identification to the county library system. Either method is 
preferable to no method; however, both have flaws. Collecting an ID to create a user ID 
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and password profile was time consuming and required two lab workers. One college 
allowed nonexpiring guest user ID that allowed the guest access to the college’s 
computer resources that never expires. Using a noncollege issued identification, such as a 
library card, to gain access to college computer resources is less time consuming; 
however, the college is still at risk. 
The Texas legislature also placed an additional mandate on community colleges 
to allow any member of the community access to the college’s computer resources. Three 
(23%) of the campuses visited showed a good alignment between the state requirement to 
identify all computer users and the policies, procedures, and practices used at the college. 
Ten (77%) of the Texas community colleges’ IT professionals in this study appeared not 
see guest user identification as a security concern. A risk analysis should be conducted by 
the IT professionals at these colleges before deciding to issues generic computer logins 
instead of issuing guest user login IDs. The Texas legislature meets every two years. 
Community college IT professionals should conduct a review during this time to ensure 
security policies, procedures, and practices that allow guest users access to the college’s 
network align with State law.  
This study can also be expanded to guest use of the community colleges wireless 
Internet portal, using strong password policies for guest users, and internal intrusion 
detection. The findings of this study indicated that 62% of the respondents see wireless 
access as a major security concern. Guest access to college computer resources via a 
college’s computer or via the college’s wireless Internet is closely related. Identification 
of all users makes internal intrusion detection much easier. 
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The review and improvements may come with some cost. Budget analysis and 
modification will be needed to find the funding. Information found in this study can be 
used as a rationale for the funding changes and help convince community college budget 
managers of the necessity of the budget increases and network changes. Using existing 
data found in State DMV databases or using existing federated tools could mitigate costs. 
A different strategy for gaining information from the IT professionals could also 
be implemented. Interviewing the IT professionals was a very labor intensive and time 
consuming process. Future studies using an online survey would allow for broader 
distribution. Fine grain questioning can be written using a Likert scale and framing open-
ended questions. Follow-up interviews can be held if additional information is needed or 
issues arise with the survey. There are many online survey cites, such as Survey Monkey, 
that will allow educators to create and distribute surveys easily and inexpensively. 
Awareness of the lack of computer security for guest users is also an excellent 
opportunity for state legislatures, government agencies, the IT industry, and IT 
associations to begin creating standardized approaches to network security at community 
colleges. For example, in response to the REAL ID Act the State of Iowa legislature 
authorized the Identity Security Project. This project consists of a clearinghouse where 
various identity documents are linked together (Combs, 2008). These include birth 
certificate, social security number, driver's license, marriage license, and death certificate. 
This system allows multiple agencies to perform cross-linked identity verification and 
provide better tracking of identity theft. The concepts of primary identification (PID) and 
secondary identification (SID) are used in this case. The birth certificate is the PID. 
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Primary identification is the document associated with all other SIDs. Only SIDs that can 
be connected directly to a PID would be issued. At the same time, the birth certificate is 
electronically associated with all other SIDs issued in the future (State of Iowa, 2008). 
Under this system when a guest user presents an ID to a computer lab employee, a 
concurrent check is run against the department of transportation’s (DOT) database. This 
IdM system incorporates an individual's picture ID with documentation and processes to 
prevent identity theft and fraud. A guest user’s ID would be rejected if a guest user 
attempted to submit a false ID.  
Industry provided solutions for quick and accurate identification of users are also 
available. Microsoft developed the .NET Passport suite of services for authenticating 
(sign-in) users across a number of applications (Microsoft, 2003). The Passport single 
sign-in service solves the user authentication problem across multiple platforms. The 
.NET Passport allows users to create a single set of credentials that will enable them to 
sign into any cite that supports a Passport service. As part of a single sign-in service, 
commonly used information can be stored in a Passport profile and transmitted to the 
participating cites when visited. Passports reduce the barriers to acquiring user 
information because new users are not required to retype all their information when 
registering at a new cite. It also enables the site to customize and enhance the guest user’s 
visit experiences without having to prompt them for user information (Microsoft, 2003). 
The nonprofit industry also provided solutions for quick and secure user access 
across platforms. The .NET framework is not the only passport type IdM solution. 
Information technology associations, such as the Liberty Alliance Project, include more 
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than 150 companies and nonprofit and government organizations around the globe. 
Interestingly enough, the alliance does not include Microsoft. The consortium developed 
an open standard for federated network identity that supports all current and emerging 
network devices. Federated identification offers businesses, governments, employees, and 
consumers a more convenient and secure way to access and control identity information 
(Liberty Alliance, n.d.). 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Matching community college security policies, procedures, and practices for 
identifying guest users is a small, but important, part of the security issues facing IT 
professionals at community colleges. Security issues at community colleges have become 
varied and wide. Information technology managers are facing new security issues and 
challenges on an ever increasing rate. The IT managers at the college level are facing 
these challenges with ever shrinking budgets, personnel, and resources, while also trying 
to meet the ever increasing demands of network users. Using an inexpensive, labor 
unintensive, reliable IdM system will make network security much easier for IT 
professionals to implement. 
This study covered the policy, procedures, and practices used by community 
college in Texas to allow guest users access to the college’s network. One of the 
outcomes of this study highlighted the lack of standardization from the State or 
educational industry regarding IdM security at Texas community colleges. This wide 
range in the responses indicated that there are issues that need to be addressed. The first 
issue revolved around passwords. Only six of the respondents stated the need for all users 
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to login with a user ID and password. Of that six, only two required strong password 
creation. 
Strong password policies may seem a small issue for a temporary guest password; 
however, strong password usage has become standardized practices across industries. 
Identity theft increases the longer a guest account remains open. The college’s risk 
increases with the length of time a guest account stays active. A good example occurred 
at one of the colleges in this study. The college policy for guest users allowed for 
unlimited access time. Without strong password policies, there is an increased potential 
for ID theft. Lack of login security leaves the community college open to hackers, 
exposing the college to lose of data security, and opening the community college to 
potential lawsuits. Future research could revolve around the method the college uses to 
construct a strong password and how long the guest ID remains usable. 
The second area that needs additional research was intrusion detection. Many 
network professionals view intrusion detection as protecting the community college data 
from outside intrusions. However, inside intrusions by students, employees, vendors, and 
guest users are just as dangerous. Intrusion detection software that analyzes data usage 
and access from both inside and outside of the network and shuts off access when 
inappropriate activity occurs will help protect the community college. More research on 
the use of intrusion detection software used by community college and industry can 
verify this concern. 
While visiting the community colleges, I noticed a general lack of security 
awareness in 77% of the community colleges. This lack of security awareness was 
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present in all the community colleges that did not require a guest user ID and password. 
Stallings (2008) stated that security awareness needs to be the first step to preventing 
security breaches. During the community college visits, I did not address training 
specifically; however, there was one question in the interview questionnaire about 
training. That question was limited to which department was responsible for training 
open lab employees. The interview did not address security training content. Future 
studies regarding the IT professional’s views on the importance of security training, the 
content of the security training, which employees to train, making the training voluntary 
or mandatory, the type of training (such as face-to-face, online, webinar, etc.) and the 
methods used to verify the employees' level of knowledge after the training are all 
suitable areas for emphasis. 
Access to the college’s wireless service was the biggest area of confusion during 
the interviews. A full 62% of the interviewees stated that securing the college’s wireless 
services was part of their ideal security system. All the community college visited have 
Wi-Fi access points (WAPs) across the campus that provide access to the college’s 
wireless network. All the colleges’ WAPs provided users with access to the Internet 
without requiring a user ID and password. Simply opening a browser and clicking on the 
guest user button while within the college’s Wi-Fi network gave the user full access to 
the Internet. Wireless access on many of the campuses reached far into the college’s 
parking lots. This reach of a WAP allows users to gain access to the community college’s 
network without leaving their cars. Although wireless Internet access was not part of this 
study, it is an area of concern that needs to be addressed. Similar interviews questions 
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could be used in a study about community colleges wireless network security policies, 
procedures, and practices. 
Another unexpected theme from the interviews involved IT budgets and funding. 
Budgets and funding were especially apparent in the small, single campus rural 
community colleges. In retrospect, this should not have been a surprise. Daniels (2001) 
wrote at length about the lack of funding for IT departments at community colleges and 
the steps IT professionals can take to make IT budgets more effective. There are several 
additional topics about funding that need future consideration. One topic should revolve 
around the budget allocation the state provided to the IT department and how the funds 
are distributed. Another topic should involve locally generated income such as 
technology fees charged by the college to students. A third topic can be added regarding 
how often these funds are collected, how these funds are allocated, and who pays the 
fees. Lastly, outside funding resources such as grants and industry funding should be 
examined. Usage of outside funding resources would give college IT professionals 
addition funds to upgrade network security or free budgeted funds to upgrade network 
security.  
Implications  
This research study’s findings yielded implications for positive social change by 
increasing the ability for the general public to use computer resources at community 
colleges, keep the access secure, and protect the community colleges from liability for 
unauthorized or illegal usage.  Other methods include, but were not limited to, improved 
IdM methods to identify guest users, provided inexpensive and labor un-intensive 
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information security methods, and provide the ability of college IT professionals to 
request additional funding to implement this protection. 
Until now, tracking guest users at most community colleges in Texas has been a 
hap-hazard mishmash of either the use of generic access codes for each computer that did 
not identify guest users, to a very labor intensive screening before issue a temporary user 
ID and passwords, to accessing an outside database for proof if identity. Each of these 
methods have their pros and cons. Using generic was simple and labor un-intensive, but 
offered the least amount of protection.  Requiring quest to furnish identification in order 
to receive a temporary user ID and password was very secure, but labor intensive.  Lab 
assistants were taken away from other duties for a long period of time to process the 
guest and issues the user ID.  Depending on a third party data base to identify guest users 
was a labor un-intensive method to offer secure user access; however, the third party 
identification did not come with a photo ID of the user.  Again, the security of the 
network was put at risk. 
Conclusions 
The lack of IdM practices at the majority of colleges visited, 77%, was 
unexpected. This dissertation began with the assumption that all community colleges in 
the State of Texas have ample policies and procedures in place to identify guest users 
who wanted to access the college’s network. I also assumed these policies and procedures 
were used to develop security practices at the college’s open computer labs. The findings 
of this study show the opposite. There were no uniform policies, procedures, or practices 
in place. The colleges that do follow IdM practices use antiquated, labor intensive 
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practices that could be overwhelmed when the number of guest users increases. Further 
automation using a centralized identification database is needed. 
This research contributed to the understanding and implementation of IdM by 
expanding the traditional view of network users at community colleges. IdM theory 
assumes that all network users go through some vetting system to verify exact identity 
credentials before the user receives access to network resources. This study indicated 
there is an active group of college computer users who do not receive any vetting at most 
colleges in the sample population. Calling attention to this group should cause college 
IdM professionals to broaden their scope of users and begin to implement IdM solutions 
for all users. Even the colleges where IdM practices were in place had problems. The 
college employees used antiquated, time consuming methods to identify the guest user. 
Improvements are needed in both systems. 
This study is significant in two areas. First, it keeps an avenue for bridging the 
digital divide open. Early in the research, it was suggested that the focus should be to find 
ways to change the law that allowed guest users access to community college computer 
resources to limit the potential for abuse. This suggestion was abandoned because it 
meant changing the funding system for community colleges in Texas. Local access to the 
community college’s resources comes with the local tax base. A local tax base keeps the 
tuition very low. Losing open access would mean losing or significantly modifying the 
local tax base. This study indicated the need to provide a standardized, inexpensive 
method of identifying guest users that can be implemented with very little labor or 
supervision. Implementing such practices should allow the colleges to budget funds more 
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